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Abstract 
This project aims to give a comprehensive explanation of Costa Rican action and 
rhetoric in foreign affairs, considering the challenges facing them and the Central 
American Region.  
 
The project has explained Costa Rican international relations at different levels. Firstly, 
the analysis explored the link between domestic and regional challenges facing Costa 
Rica, and their branding as a peace-loving country. This has been achieved by 
researching social statistical material regarding the region, such as the homicide rates, 
the numbers of civilian firearms and the numbers of armed conflicts, and was 
supplemented by an investigation of the organization and budget of the Costa Rican 
police force. Secondly, the project has analyzed Costa Rica’s role in the military de-
escalation of Central America, based on Paul Collier’s empirical findings of indicators of 
regional cooperation on military de-escalation. Furthermore, there was an emphasis on 
how reciprocity in interdependency is made harder by the rooted tension between 
Costa Rica and their neighbor Nicaragua, and by the region’s history of turmoil and 
violence. Lastly, the focus shifted towards how Costa Rica’s options in foreign policy 
were, and still are intrinsically connected to the international power constellations. The 
project thus stressed that US hegemony can be seen to have had a great influence over 
the strategies chosen by Costa Rica, and that hegemony can well be manifested in the 
economic realm. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s trade and diplomatic relationship to the 
People’s Republic of China is another foreign policy aspect which proves Costa Rican 
band-wagoning strategies and the fact that liberal discourses of the Human Security 
paradigm are secondary to the realities of financial self-interest and national security. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction - Field of interest 
Our motivation for writing a project about Costa Rica was an interest in analysing the 
foreign policy of a country which on the surface appears to contradict Kenneth Waltz’s 
notions of national interest and self-help system (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 74). 
Therefore we have chosen to investigate the international relations of a country which 
does not only have a core belief in peacekeeping, cooperation and disarmament, but also 
seems to act upon it. Thus Costa Rica might be an ‘abnormality’ as an army-less, 
peacekeeping nation, who believe in global governance.  
 
Our point of departure for studying Costa Rica’s foreign policy is a main interest in the 
country’s international relations, with an emphasis on them being an army-less nation. 
This project takes on a neorealist view of the world, which is understood as a system 
which is always inherently bearing the potential for conflict, for a perpetual reiteration 
of a history of warfare.  We thus share the view that the world consists of sovereign 
states, which fight for promoting their national interest, or at least for protecting their 
national security in an anarchic system. Furthermore, according to Waltz, the very fact 
that the international political system is anarchic makes it a self-help system where 
states’ main concern is their survival hence there is a focus on security (Layne, 1993, p. 
11). The very nature of the system is not only anarchic but also competitive, which 
prompts qualified states to seek great power status. It is easy to argue for the belief that 
the international system is one of great potential for conflict, a unipolar system and that 
alliances are only are made during war to balance-off power. A few examples could be 
the western allies during World War II, which split up in two poles, the USA and the 
Soviet Union.  
 
The Republic of Costa Rica is a presidential democracy with a legislative assembly, 
located in the Central American region with the neighbours Nicaragua to the north and 
Panama to the south. The aspect which makes this case an extremely interesting one is 
the fact that Costa Rica is a de-militarized nation which is geographically placed in the 
middle of a region of historical, ideological conflicts, with a high rate of drug related 
crimes. In a world bearing the perpetual potential for conflict, Costa Rica has shown 
signs of being a pacifist, peaceful, and institutionalized exception in the region of Central 
America, similar in certain regards to Switzerland or Austria. Costa Rican neutrality is 
compared to Switzerland or Austria of no international legal standing, it has no military 
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forces, but compared to the latter, it is active in regional defence pacts, such as the 
RioPactandrelies army, which they rely on for protection (Furlong, 1987, p. 151).  
 
Since Costa Rica’s abolishment of its armed forced in 1948 by president Figueres, the 
nation has invested in more welfare, such as education, health care etc., and is now 
housing up to 25 international organisations, such as The University for Peace, The Pan 
American Health Organization/The World Health Organization and The American Court 
of Human Rights etc. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Costa Rica, 2012). 
Thus the country has a strong belief in global governance and has in many cases relied 
on the use of UN courts such as The International Court of Justice to rule decisions 
mainly in border disputes, and they often succeed in meeting the IDG (International 
Developmental Goals). Also a number of UN statements expressed by Costa Rican 
executives or Costa Rican bureaucrats show the nation’s emphasis on a need for 
international cooperation on issues such as global warming, and peacekeeping.  
 
This is one way of understanding Costa Rican international relations as being liberal, 
and peacekeeping in nature, based on beliefs in global governance and international 
cooperation. We however see another way of understanding Costa Rican international 
relations. With this project we want to challenge the common understanding of Costa 
Rica as only behaving in a liberal manner on the stage of international relations. One 
thing is the statements expressed in the UN courts or assemblies, but another thing is 
the hard realities and facts hidden behind discourses.  
 
A research fellow from the organisation COHA1, Alex Sanchez opposes this view which 
describes Costa Rica as liberal. The article “Costa Rica: An Army-less Nation in a Problem-
Prone Region” by COHA research fellow Alex Sanchez argues that Costa Rica is more 
focused on national security issues than being a peace-keeping nation as they portray 
themselves to be. Sanchez points to both internal and external problems facing Costa 
Rica, such as the geographical location with drug trafficking as an internal problem and 
the Nicaraguan border dispute as an external one, and the argument ends up with him 
indirectly suggesting the reinforcement of the military defences in Costa Rica (Council 
on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 2011). 
 
                                                        
1 The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) was founded in 1975 as a non-profit, independent research 
and information organization, to make the affairs of the region more visible and increase the importance of 
inter-American relationship, and to encourage rational and constructive U.S. policies towards Latin America 
(Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 2012). 
 5 
 
We want to research if there are actually more empirical facts emphasising Costa Rican 
international relations as of a neorealist nature, meaning any possible increase in the 
defence budget, such as military or police forces, which could lead to Costa Rica evolving 
into a state whose main interest is to fight for its sovereignty. If this is the case, so is this 
a recent development, or can the discourse of Costa Rican foreign policy through several 
United Nations (UN) statements be seen as a tool for keeping a certain reputation in 
international relations while the real agenda has for many years been one of increased 
national security and building of alliances to maintain sovereignty.  
 
This leads us to the following assumption that Costa Rica could be- despite its great 
belief in Global governance- a country fighting for nothing more than self-interest, in an 
anarchic world of sovereign states due to an increase in defence budget.     
 
To further study this assumption we have designed a research question: 
 
Can Costa Rican international relations be explained through a 
neorealist perspective or is Costa Rica a true exception of peace and 
cooperation? 
 
This research question thus aims to investigate internal and external policies of Costa 
Rica, because it seems that the country is a exception in a world where every other state 
is behaving in neorealist manners, in order to protect their national sovereignty and 
self-interest. By a true exception, we find a lot of evidence pointing towards Costa Rica 
as a country of peacekeeping norms and ideals. We though consider that rhetoric is one 
thing, and actions are another. In order to answer our research question we have come 
up with three sub questions which offer complementary perspectives.  These three sub 
questions will be addressed more detailed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
1.1 Sub questions and structure of the project  
As mentioned earlier we have created three sub questions to guide our answering of the 
research question. We will thus in this section first present the question and then 
describe its meaning and how we will use to answer the research question. Therefore 
we will begin with sub question one, which will be addressed in chapter 4 part 1. This 
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sub question will relate to the link between foreign policy of Costa Rica and the 
domestic/regional challenges that as Costa Rica are exposed to: 
 
1. Could foreign policy behaviour of Costa Rica be explained by domestic and 
regional challenges? 
 
The main point with this sub question is to argue that internal affairs support our 
neorealist assumptions regarding both Costa Rican regional and international 
behaviour. By challenges we understand the regional affairs of Central America as of 
ideological and armed conflicts, drug trafficking and border disputes. This is done by 
investigating an increase in the police force and their specific assignments concerning 
national security, looking at the influence of the constitution, describing the border 
dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and last but not least, by taking into account 
the problems of drug trafficking.  This sub question will be addressed in the analysis 
chapter 4 part 1 “Costa Rica: An oasis of peace in a region of turmoil?”. Our second 
question will focus on the peer pressure in the region and how it affects regional 
challenges and external problems: 
 
2. To what degree does peer pressure affect regional challenges and external 
problems? 
 
The function of sub question 2 is to incorporate findings from the previous by further 
explaining the link between regional and international problems. This sub question will 
thus explain how regional cooperation in military reduction is an important aspect. We 
want to examine how Central America has been successful in regional cooperation to 
reduce military spending, while taking into account the challenges facing Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua (a challenges there will be addressed by sub question one). This question will 
be addressed in the analysis chapter 4 part 2 “Costa Rican military spending as regional 
peer pressure?” the last of our three sub question we will addresses indicators of neo-
realistic behaviour in the country’s foreign policy: 
 
3. What instances of Costa Rican neo-realist behaviour can be accounted for in 
foreign policy? 
 
In this finally sub question we will explain further how these regional and local 
challenges impact on Costa Rican international relationships by incorporating further 
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neorealist theoretical aspects. The foreign policy outside the region refers to relations 
with the United States of America (USA) and China, which will be explained through 
examples of manifested USA hegemony and band-wagoning, this will be addressed in 
the analysis chapter 4 part 3 “Hegemonic aspects of Costa Rican behaviour in foreign 
policy”. 
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Chapter 2 : Method 
Moving from the introduction, which outlined our motivation, presented our research 
questions and emphasised how to approach the answer by structuring three sub 
questions, we now turn to methodological consideration. This chapter will therefore, 
first touch upon these methodological considerations such as research design, 
limitations and choice of method.  Second we will present our choice of theory and 
further argue the gains of these specific choices in answering the research questions.   
 
2.1 Research Design 
The most feasible solution for this project was to adopt a case study as a research 
design, in order to investigate international relations as being of neorealist nature. We 
need to point out that Costa Rica appears to be a unique example in the Central 
American Region, which we consider as a problem prone region (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 
1). A high degree of democracy rate, a significant low homicide rate and a low crime rate 
contribute to the uniqueness of Costa Rica compared to other countries in the region 
such as Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua  (cf. Criminal Statistics of Costa Rica and the 
Central American Region) support our view about the uniqueness of Costa Rica. We 
could also find further arguments for that, such as their attempts for regional 
cooperation, which is reflected in them being the country with the highest number of 
UN-offices in the Central American Region, and in the fact that they are a non-military 
state and the first one in their region to abolish their armed forces.  
 
What we want to gain from this unique case study is to focus on how they actually can 
be seen to deviate from their unique stance of cooperativeness and peacekeeping by 
attaining a more neorealist agenda. Another important aspect in pointing out the 
uniqueness of the case is to look at data on neighbouring countries, not in order to 
compare them, but to emphasize what is so special about the Costa Rican values. It is 
thus important to stress that our main focus is the Central American Region when 
comparing data, because of not only the geographical context but also the historical 
context of the region, which would not apply to any other regions or countries known 
for peacekeeping and neutrality, such as Europe or Switzerland.  
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2.2 Reflections when choosing a unique case study 
The research will compare Costa Rica to a country like Nicaragua, to point out where 
they deviate, and thus to find out if they meet the international expectations, because of 
their own brand as a peacekeeping nation. When choosing Costa Rica, based on their 
uniqueness, we want to question if they appear to be like any other country in the 
region, by having a focus on national security and self-interest. We can thus explain that 
Costa Rica appears to be different from other countries engaged in international 
relation, since most states use military force for both national and international 
protection, in order to avoid threats. When considering that Costa Rica is located in a 
problem-prone area with drug trafficking and coups-d’état, the main question is how 
could they abolish the military, and have they really found the key to cooperation and 
peace? We would expect them to behave differently than they have, so their previous 
behaviour has made them unique. 
 Furthermore, the case can be used to show that there is a possibility for cooperation 
and peacekeeping, but that this is only valid at the superficial level, because we argue 
that state-power will always go beyond cooperation.  This is precisely the point which 
we want to show by applying the case study within its historical and political context. 
We cannot use the case for stating causal links between the abolishment of the armed 
forces and a low rate of crime and high rate of democracy, and thus generalize that this 
would be the case of the whole region. This is because we explain the uniqueness of 
Costa Rica through a historical context, with specific events shaping the country such as 
the abolishment of the armed forced, the Arias Peace Plan etc., which are unique events 
happening under unique, complex circumstances, which cannot apply directly to any 
other country of the region. 
 
To limit ourselves, we have chosen to focus both on the civil war and the abolishment of 
the army, in order to understand why Costa Rica is a leading example of peacekeeping 
behaviour. Additionally, we examine some aspects from the 1980’s and onward, with 
the purpose of to arguing that there has been a systemic shift in Costa Rica, which has 
also affected their foreign policies.  
When choosing Costa Rica as a case study, most of the official text concerning 
government websites and the police force etc. are in Spanish. So some of the official 
statements mentioned in our report is from Spanish sources, which we have translated 
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into English. There is always a risk when using original sources in different languages, 
but we have taken that into account and worked cautiously with the material. 
Additionally, we incorporated the original Spanish text in the appendix. 
 
2.3 Appliance of methodology in analyzing the case  
2.3.1 Secondary literature 
As our study consists of mixed methods, we would like to apply the combination 
described by Bryman as ‘Explanation’. Explanation means thus, as implied in the word, 
to use one method in order to explain results or findings from the other (Bryman, 2008, 
p. 609). In our study we apply the explanation combination by using qualitative data- 
with a focus, among others, on rhetoric- to explain quantitative data such as crime rates, 
democracy rates and military budgets. It is though difficult for this study to adhere 
completely to this combination, because we use secondary literature, i.e. other research 
studies, whose findings are of qualitative character, such as critical discourse analysis. 
Therefore we do not apply our own qualitative methods, but use the findings of others. 
Bryman argues that to adopt a combination of explanation you have to explain the 
relationship between variables (Bryman, 2008, p. 616), which is why one has to use a 
second method to explain the findings of the first. One way to do this is to analyse the 
relationship between three variables, the independent, the dependent and the 
intervening, where the intervening variable changes the relationship between the others 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 616). In the case of Costa Rica we thus see the international relations 
of Costa Rica as the dependent variable, because it depends on how they brand 
themselves internationally, and by their actions, such as their rhetoric of peacekeeping 
and cooperation. We thus want to bring in the intervening variable, such as the border 
dispute, drug trafficking and overall a regional history of conflict which would thus 
challenge this relationship.  
 
To state this relationship we thus apply quantitative data, to show if there is causality on 
the one side between the police budget, the abolishment of the army and democracy 
ratings, and on the other side a military de-escalation of the region.  We thus want to 
research how the reduction of military spending and the country’s increased 
involvement in IGO’s, can be used as a link between the allocation of resources from 
military to police forces and the shift towards neo-realism. 
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2.3.2 Ontological and epistemological consideration 
As researchers, we want to emphasize the importance of statecraft in an international 
society of states. From the introduction and onwards we use a neorealist argumentation. 
From this standpoint the argumentation would be of similar to Kenneth Waltz’s – an 
international system of anarchy with sovereign states fighting for self-interest, by also 
stressing the importance of hegemony. The main points of this argumentation are to be 
critical and oppose the Costa Rican discourse of peace-keeping and cooperation by 
stressing sovereignty as a conditional, national, necessity for any country, Costa Rica not 
excluded. 
 
We find it possible to explain what we would call a shift in paradigm concerning Costa 
Rican external politics by employing statistical data on military spending, crime rates, 
drug trafficking and official political statements. But while doing this it is not so easy to 
place ourselves exclusively within a single perspective, such as neo-realism or the 
English school, but instead we just use several aspects from the different views, such as 
norms and ideas, and national sovereignty and self-interest. 
 
2.4 Theory 
2.4.1 Military Spending 
This part examines Paul Collier’s paper on how military spending can be understood 
due to external and internal threats, how to reduce it, and how to make regional 
cooperation efficient. Paul Collier’s research has a positivist stance, because of the 
‘objectivist findings’ that he uses to create hypothetical examples which explain levels of 
military spending on both a global, and on different regional levels such as Latin 
America and Africa. This section focuses on both his empirical findings of levels of 
military spending, and on his suggestion for regional cooperation. Furthermore, this 
section includes his hypothetical examples of Latin America.  
 
The purpose of incorporating his findings is to point out some explanations of military 
spending by incorporating principles and arguments on how to understand the 
relationship between military spending, peer pressure, reciprocity and 
interdependency. His paper examines factors which he believes are shaping the 
environment for military reduction, such as neighbourhoods, high levels of democracy, 
growth in GDP, free trade and foreign aid.  
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This theory is incorporated because it arrived- by means of some broad research on 
Latin America- at some notions on how to comprehend military spending and how to 
reduce it through regional cooperation. Our focus is mainly on how to explain military 
spending and its implications for regional cooperation, while a second priority is to 
address the aspect of foreign aid. The aspect of free trade is only used as a comparison 
to military spending. Collier’s definition of military spending emphasizes that it has the 
quality of being at the same time a national public good, and a neighbourhood public 
bad. (Collier, 2007, p. 5) 
 
2.4.1.1 Six complications that make military spending excessive 
The theory departs from an argument that security is a classic public good, but he 
believes that the rational is weaker, and therefore points out six complications which he 
believes make military spending excessive. (Collier, 2007, p. 5) 
 
1. Military spending creates national security, also called a national public good, 
but reduces national security in neighbour countries, which instead should be 
achieved by neighbourhood cooperation on maintaining a low military spending. 
(Collier, 2007, pp. 5-6) 
 
2. A country needs to match its neighbour on military spending to feel secure 
(ibid). This is seen as a high form of interdependence. Collier argues that 
military spending will, because of the interdependence as cumulative effect, 
never end up as a national public good. (Collier, 2007, p. 6) 
 
3. Military spending is a race to the top, which only ends when the financing 
demands cannot be met. On one side it is an advantage to be the first mover on a 
pre-emptive increase, while it is sometimes a disadvantage to be a first mover on 
military reduction. (Collier, 2007, p. 6) 
 
4. An increase in military spending might be of internal deterrence such as 
preventing military coups but at the same time, it could be perceived as a threat 
to its neighbours. This creates regional public bad and might end up with an 
arms race. (Collier, 2007, p. 7) 
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5. There is a great difference between bilateral and multilateral interdependence in 
matters of reciprocity on military spending, i.e. two neighbours would care 
about the other’s decision, but not about the third’s. He stresses countries in a 
small neighbourhood like that of Central America gain from regional agreements 
on limiting military spending (Collier, 2007, pp. 7-10) 
 
6. It is hard to measure the benefits of military spending when smaller changes in 
the risk of war make military spending analogous to fashion, to spend the same 
as the neighbour. Therefore he argues that norms matter most, not pay-offs. 
(Collier, 2007, p. 7) 
  
2.4.1.2 The importance of Neighborhood  
As stated above, the theory sees military spending as a neighbourhood public bad, and 
neighbours matter in this issue (Collier, 2007, p. 27). The neighbourhood public bad is a 
term used to describe the implication which the action of one country has on its 
neighbours, with emphasis on the military spending (ibid.). Therefore one must 
coordinate with one’s neighbours to internalize the externalities (ibid.). This means that 
regional coordination leads to reducing military spending.  
 
Spending is thus measured by the size of the military in neighbouring countries, which 
are societies that more or less can be seen as familiar. Neighbours can be seen to 
influence the military budget in two different ways. One is that by a perceived threat and 
a second is by comparison (Collier, 2007, p. 12). When estimating the perceived threat, 
it evolves around the absolute amount of military spending. Here he uses an example of 
the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea increased its military spending in the 
conflict, and to answer the threat according to Collier, Ethiopia had to match. Ethiopia 
didn’t have to spend the same share of GDP because it has a larger economy (ibid.).  
The second option is when comparison is the spending indicator, which means that  the 
country would have to match the share of GDP to maintain stability, because the 
neighbours are not perceived as a threat (ibid.). In dealing with the neighbourhood 
interdependency, it is important to distinguish between external threats and 
benchmarking. Collier argues that trust is better attained if interdependency is due to 
benchmarking, because all countries in a neighbourhood can gain from jointly setting a 
lower benchmark (ibid.). But if the interdependency is due to a perceived external 
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threat, there could be a chance for countries to increase their spending for national 
protection, despite an agreement on a benchmark for the spending, 
Concerning reciprocity as an important part of interdependency in neighbourhoods it is 
evidently important to consider the number of participants in groups. This is because in 
smaller groups, it is easier for countries to recognize the consequences of being a deal 
breaker (Collier, 2007, p. 39). This is quite ambiguous when considering Collier’s 
argument about interdependency as driven by concerns about neighbours, which 
includes that a third country would not care about the other neighbour of the second 
country (Collier, 2007, p. 31). 
There are two problems with regional coordination, as it will be argued in the present 
report. In most cases, the problem relies in the lack of governments in providing public 
goods, but it is also the problem of freeriding, i.e. when there are no incentives for 
governments to cooperate. Collier argues that instead, the key is to design an efficient 
incentive mechanism to induce the need for collective action (Collier, 2007, p. 27). These 
incentives must be designed to show decision-takers in charge of public bads the cost of 
their actions (ibid.). By public bad, we understand something which threatens the 
common good of a region, such as violating territorial boundaries or increasing the level 
of armed forces. The theory thus arrives at some principles for how to make military 
reduction possible. Here, the importance of target levels is being stressed Countries 
would have to agree on target levels, because the incentives for military spending are 
based on how much another country spends.  
 
2.4.1.3 Other incitements for military reduction 
We have picked out six issues, which Collier argues that create incentives for military 
reduction. Those are a (1) comparison to free-trade, (2) a reduction should lead to 
investment in social spending, (3) reduction creates economic growth, (4) a special case 
for increased spending concerning rebellions, (5) the need for transparency in spending, 
(6) plus the effect of high levels of democracy. 
 
The comparison between free-trade barriers and reduction in military spending is 
important because it highlights the difficulties of observing military spending. To benefit 
the most, there should be a reciprocal preference for military reduction alike the free-
trade. But first of all, this leaves beneficial incentives for neighbours of de-escalated 
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countries not to match, and secondly, military spending is difficult to observe, costly to 
reduce and difficult to reverse (Collier, 2007, p. 26). Despite this, Collier points out that 
reduction in military spending is opposed to freeing trade, as there are no winners or 
losers (ibid.). (2) The paper argues that there must be a bigger incentive for social 
investment when reducing military spending, thus a link that should be officially stated 
by a country when de-escalating its military expenditure. Additionally, the country 
should be transparent in the social commitment which they choose to endorse. When 
one links a reduction in military spending to specific beneficiaries, such as those 
benefitting from social spending on education and health, one has a large group, namely 
the users of the services, as new political lobbying exerting military lobbying. This 
lobbying is thus a pressure within society but Collier points out that in order to achieve 
it regionally through peer pressure, one has to have clear quantitative targets (Collier, 
2007, p. 39). (3) Collier highlights that a reduction in military spending creates 
economic growth for a country, but at the same time, he stresses that when per capita 
income rises in a society, the government will increase its military expenditures much 
faster than the growth of this income, i.e. its share in GDP rises. (4) This theory also 
states a very important fact concerning the Central American Region that is of utmost 
interest in our case. A rationale for positive military spending in the region is to fight 
rebellions (Collier, 2007, p. 28). Budgeting the military spending is thus here considered 
a normative issue, where it is important to incorporate the exception of fighting 
rebellions as a legitimate need for a country (ibid.). Thus, as more or less pointed out, 
the interdependency is an important aspect of military spending, which makes clear the 
cost of uncoordinated decisions that affect the common good of the region (ibid.). This 
interdependency creates reciprocity, which in turn makes an incentive for each country 
to go ahead of its neighbours spending (ibid.). (5) The theory points out another 
important principle of reducing military spending. Here it stresses the need for changing 
incentives by making spending decisions transparent and explicitly interlinked (ibid.). 
(6) Last but not least, Collier argues that a trend in increased democracy scores would 
mean less influence to the military lobby and thus a reduction in military spending. He 
points out that this link can be understood in a simulation of Latin American military 
spending. This shows that a reduction of 12 % would imply a saving of 3.4 billion us 
dollars (Collier, 2007, p. 19). 
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2.4.2 A manifesto – regional cooperation as a mechanism for military 
reduction 
The conclusion offered by this report stresses that military spending should be 
addressed at a regional level, which will benefit its government and be a pioneering 
model for other regions. Following the findings in his report, Collier formulates a 
manifesto. He points out two characteristics that make regional groupings more suited 
for a cooperation to reduce military spending. One is that a regional group with member 
countries of small size have more to gain from reducing military expenses, because 
countries of small populations usually have higher spending on military (Collier, 2007, 
p. 48). The second is that if the number of countries participating in the cooperation is 
small, then there are better odds for success, and he makes reference to Central America 
by calling it a neighbourhood role model for sustained reduction of military spending in 
the region (ibid.). He argues that this should have a multiplying effect on other regions, 
and end up in a global reduction (ibid.). 
 
The way to obtain a plan for a common goal on military reduction for the region would 
be, according to Collier, to establish a process and a timetable, through the guidance of a 
trusted regional economic agency. Part of this process is to have an agreed target ceiling 
on military spending and a way to get there, such as: mechanisms to provide incentives 
for compliance; agreements on making a link between reduction in military spending 
and an increase in social spending; agreements on how to define a military spending of 
relevance and how to verify the reductions (ibid.).  
 
In this part we have pointed out some of the main incentives presented by the scholar 
Paul Collier for military reduction. Some of the main points from this theory will be 
incorporated in the analysis, to explain incentives for Costa Rica to reduce military 
expenditures, but also to criticize the findings for neglecting important contextual 
issues, such as those related to the border dispute and to drug trafficking. We thus see 
many aspects of this theory as important when analysing Costa Rican military spending, 
but at the same time, we criticise this theory for being too utopian in character. Collier 
argues that regional agreements on military reduction create a more peaceful 
environment, but he does not present some actual descriptive evidence on the number 
of soldiers employed in the region or in the respective countries, and the security 
assignment of the police forces as being of military character is also neglected. Neither 
does the theory at least present some of the many episodes of terror in the 1980’s in the 
region, which might have created a greater incentive for national security escalation.    
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2.4.3 Odious Debt 
Part of the power play in which economics plays a major role is international lending by 
the strong countries and transnational organizations, directed at poorer countries in the 
global South. Many times, these countries’ external debts transform into odious debt. 
The best known definition of odious debt is the one provided by Alexander Sack in 1927:  
 
“Debts are odious and do not have to be paid by a successor regime if (i) the 
regime incurring them was despotic (often taken to mean, lacking the consent 
of the populace); (ii) the debts produced no benefit for the populace; and (iii) 
the creditors knew about the likely misuse of the funds they were advancing.” 
(Ludington, et al., 2009, p. 2) 
 
As it appears, however, establishing when a debt is odious and when it is not is a 
complicated task, which involves ambiguous and context dependent judging. Louis A. 
Pérez, Jr. and Deborah M. Weissman argue that the legal practice in assessing such cases 
is far from perfect, because it is politically biased towards the governmental interests of 
the USA, which has acted numerous times as a true hegemon in the economic sphere, 
not only in the military one. In their words: 
 
“Foreign banking is politicized and foreign policy is commercialized. The 
realpolitik of lending activity requires a debt resolution framework that 
addresses not only the circumstances of the sovereign debtor or the practices of 
creditor banks, but the circumstances of U.S. interests in which all such 
transactions are conceived and conducted.” (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, pp. 
43-44) 
 
 “[T]his [the political bias and circumstance- sensitive legal assessments] hardly 
leads to a workable legal theory for resolving Odious Debts and defeats any 
likelihood of achieving stability, predictability, or a common set of standards by 
which relief may be granted for citizens plagued with the burdens of these 
transactions.” (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 58) 
 
The tone of their research paper is a quite distinctly critical one, almost in a Marxist 
style. In order to prove their main thesis, namely that the political interests of 
hegemonic powers make themselves felt including in apparently neutral, economic 
matters, the authors employ historical research of instances when US government 
interests had a say in issues related to the foreign debt of other (poorer and weaker) 
states. Either by interpreting the law under circumstantially favorable understanding 
(Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, pp. 54-58) or by turning a blind eye to moral and legal 
considerations when wrongfully lending money in the first place (Pérez & M. Weissman, 
2007, pp. 15,32,35), the political is prevalent and sustains ways of hegemonic 
domination.  
 19 
 
Furthermore, foreign loans were a historical way of securing instrumentally the 
Western (read, USA) control over internal matters of smaller nations (Pérez & M. 
Weissman, 2007, p. 11), including in the context of the Cold War (Pérez & M. Weissman, 
2007, p. 26). The most relevant part of the article, in terms of our research scope, was 
the case study of Costa Rican foreign debt in the beginning of the 80’s, which the authors 
discuss at length in the context of odious debt, although this debt did not exactly qualify 
as such. We will return to the Costa Rican foreign debt case in the analysis section.  
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter first presented our methodological considerations such as why we wanted 
to apply a case study as our research design with Costa Rica as a unique case.  Second 
the chapter provided some insights on our gains or losses when choosing “explanation” 
as a combination of methods. Third the chapter touch upon ontological and 
epistemological considerations. Fourth and final we presented gains of military spending 
and odious debt as being our choice of theory to answer the research question. 
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Chapter 3 : Costa Rican historical events 
In this chapter, we find it relevant to give a presentation of the most important historical 
events of Costa Rica dating back to the formation of Costa Rica after its Independence 
from Spain in 1821. The aim is to describe the events which have led to the formation of 
Costa Rica as the country it is today. Like all countries, Costa Rica is rich in history with 
numerous events that can attribute minor or major importance in relation to the overall 
picture of the country’s history.  Of these countless events we will more specifically 
focus on the following four events that we have found to have had a crucial impact on 
Costa Rica: (1) the internal history of Costa Rica in the colonial times before the 
independence from Spain. (2) the events concerning the independence. (3) the last civil 
war. (4) the abolishing of the military in 1948 and the new constitution. 
  
3.1 Internal history of Costa Rica 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the aim of this first section is to give a 
brief summary of the internal history of Costa Rica, dating back to the start the 19th 
century (incl. events related to the colonial time) and continuing to events of more 
recent times. To operationalize this, we have chosen to describe some specific events in 
the internal history and some important historical events in the Central American 
region, which we believe affect the way Costa Rica acts in international relations. It is 
our aim to use this information in order to make an understanding of the “uniqueness” 
of Costa Rica and of the carefully constructed identity of peace and democracy 
(Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 1). Studies of Latin and Central America often describe Costa Rica 
as an abnormality in the region, a Switzerland of Central America, or simply just as “the 
unique case of Costa Rica”  (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 473). Behind these 
descriptions, we find a country with a significantly higher life expectancy at birth, a 
lower infant mortality, a much higher number of the population attending higher 
education than any other countries in the region, and with the oldest democratic 
tradition in Central America (ibid.).  These unique characteristics of Costa Rica are 
argued to have started earlier in the country’s history, dating as far back as the start of 
the Colonial time (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 476), where the somehow special 
geographic and demographic circumstances called for a different development 
compared to other countries of the surrounding area. These are, on the one hand, the 
mountain chain that basically divides Costa Rica into two, serving thus as a geographical 
boundary, which protects the country from hostile invasions, and on the other hand, 
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Costa Rica’s lower population of native Indians, compared to other Central American 
countries. This latter characteristic meant that they didn’t have a major “cheap” labour 
force to exploit (ibid.). Therefore, the colonial masters were compelled to seek 
development through other methods, including to some extent a more equitable 
relationship between the local population and the colonial population (ibid.). 
 
3.2 Independence from Spain in 1821 
Costa Rica gained independence from Spain together with five other former colonies 
after the end of the Mexican war in 1821. Costa Rica did therefore never fight for its 
independence, as it has been the case with many former colonies throughout the world 
(J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 476). In the period after the independence, Costa Rica 
experienced a high degree of isolation from other countries in the region, except for the 
years just after the independence, when Costa Rica joined a loose federation (J. Wiarda 
& F. Kline, 2011, p. 477). However, this isolation proved to be very beneficial for Costa 
Rica, as it protected the country from the waves of civil war and the violence that swept 
over the region in the post-independence period (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 476). So 
was the case in relation to the wave of dictatorships and foreign invasions that also 
swept across the region in this period (ibid.). Therefore, these had a relativly little 
impact on Costa Rica compared with other countries in the region (ibid.). A curiosity 
that furter stresses the notion of the “uniqueness” of Costa Rica is that this country, 
unlike many other countries in the region, never has experienced an invasion from the  
USA armed forces, a fact which may very well be attributed to Costa Rica’s indeed very 
close relationship to the USA (ibid.). This relationship will further be adressed in a later 
section of this project (cf. Hegemonic aspects of Costa Rican behaviour in foreign policy). 
 
3.3 The last civil war in Costa Rica 
In the forgoing sections we have learned that Costa Rica was in many ways spared (or at 
least played a minor role) by many of the events which the rest of the Central American 
region has suffered from in the period after the independence from Spain. Nevertheless, 
Costa Rica experienced a vicious civil war in the period after the Second World War (J. 
Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 481). This civil war has largely influenced Costa Rica in 
becoming the country it is today (ibid.). Of the events related to the civil war, we 
consider the removal of the military (both by eliminating all defence and armed forces, 
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as well as by nearly eliminating the possibility of its reintroduction2) as having 
extremely high importance to the Costa Rica we see today. This influence will be 
described in the following section, and analysed in more detail in the following chapters. 
In the following sections we will present the events which have led to the civil war, the 
factions struggling for power and control during the civil war, and lastly, the outcome of 
the civil war. 
 
3.3.1 Events leading to the civil war 
As a result of the Nazi- controlled Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1943, the 
coffee oligarchy elected Rafael Angel Colderón Guardia formed an alliance with the 
Costa Rican Communist party (Popular Vanguard party) (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 
480). This alliance however caused a high degree of unrest and division in Costa Rica. In 
spite of the unrest, this alliance between Colderón and the Communist party won the 
elections in 1944 (ibid.). But with the end of the Second World War in 1945, the 
continuation of the alliance with the Communist party caused a growing amount of 
protest inside Costa Rica. In 1948, a coalition of traditional coffee oligarchy and young 
reformist social democrats defeated Colderón, who was again running for presidency 
(ibid.).  Colderón still had the majority of the legislature on his side, so the election was 
annulled (ibid.). This resulted in José (Pepe) Figueres Ferrer organizing an armed group 
in the mountains, south of the capital San Jose. This armed group eventually engaged in 
a short, but nevertheless violent and bloody civil war against the government forces. 
(ibid.) 
 
3.3.2 The Costa Rican constitution 
Costa Rica was under leadership of José (Pepe) Figueres Ferrer (the former leader of the 
armed rebel movement) after the end of the civil war in 1948, when a new Constitution 
was drafted and approved. The Constitution was first of all modern in its form by 
guaranteeing a wide range rights, but it did however also outlaw political parties which 
were perceived as harmful to the democracy, including the Communist party of Costa 
Rica (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 480). Another important change in the new 
constitution was Article 12, which removed the army as a permanent institution and 
replaced it with paramilitary forces of civil guards, placed under the control of civilian 
power (ibid.).  
                                                        
2 If not impossible, then hampered to such an extent, that the re-institution of the army is 
extremely unlikely. 
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ARTICLE 12. The Army as a permanent institution is abolished. There shall be 
the necessary police forces for surveillance and the preservation of the public 
order. 
 
Military forces may only be organized under a continental agreement or for the 
national defense; in either case, they shall always be subordinate to the civil 
power: they may not deliberate or make statements or representations 
individually or collectively. (WIPO - World Intellectual Property Organization, 
2005) 
 
This abolishing of the military in 1948 as a result of the civil war will be addressed 
further in the next section of this chapter. 
 
3.3.3 The Costa Rican abolishing of the military in 1948 
We find the historical event of the abolishing of the military, dating back to 1948, as very 
important for understanding the current situation of Costa Rica and its uniqueness 
compared to other countries in the region. The official explanation given for the 
abolishing of the military shall be found in the bloody civil war and in a united wish for a 
more peaceful world, based on mutual understanding and negotiation, rather than on 
the use of brutal force and military capability (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 480). As a 
result of these choices, Costa Rica has a very large engagement in International 
organizations e.g. UN etc. (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 483). Costa Rica does not, as 
such, have any military capabilities, and has formulated in its Constitution that the 
military cannot be reinstated without a referendum (J. Wiarda & F. Kline, 2011, p. 475) 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have addressed a presentation of four historical events which we find 
to have had great importance in regards to influencing and shaping Costa Rica to 
become the unique country it is today, compared to the other five countries in the 
Central American region. We have studied the internal historical events in the colonial 
times and the events concerning the independence from Spain, which have led to the 
last civil war in Costa Rica (until present). Furthermore, we have studied the importance 
of the civil war for the construction of the "modern" Costa Rica, and finally, we examined 
certain aspects of the new constitution, introduced after the Civil War. Of special interest 
was Article 12 concerning the abolition of the standing army (and limitations in relation 
to the possible future restoration of any kind of army in the country). 
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In the following chapter, we will provide a deeper analysis of the internal structures of 
Costa Rica to examine our research question: Can Costa Rican international relations be 
explained through a neorealist perspective or is Costa Rica a true exception of peace and 
cooperation?  This will be achieved by relying on the following four areas of analysis: (1) 
the crime statistics on homicides and the use of firearms. (2) the border dispute with 
Nicaragua. (3) the violence and turmoil in the region. (4) the police force (structure and 
budget). 
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Chapter 4 : Analysis 
The neo-realist assumptions which have guided us in the writing of this project will be 
further deepened and applied to the analysis of Costa Rican foreign relations. However, 
it is our view that external and internal matters of a country are always inter-related 
and that they have to be understood in the specific context in which they exist and 
unfold. Therefore, we will present arguments about the assumed neo-realist strategies 
that Costa Rica has led at the regional level, in the context of Central America. This will 
be made possible in part one, in which we intend to describe some features related to 
Costa Rica’s relatively peaceful present,  and to the internal structures and budget of the 
police, as well as to the way Costa Rica brands itself as a nation. Additionally, the report 
will reach the delicate points of the war against drug-trafficking and of Costa Rica’s 
tense relationship with its neighbour, Nicaragua, which has certain historical roots and 
is currently manifested in the border dispute related to the river San Juan. 
 
The second part of the analysis continues the same line of thought, guided by neo-realist 
assumptions, by analysing the concept of regional peer pressure in relation to military 
spending within the context of Central America. It is at this point that we will provide an 
analysis of Costa Rican foreign policy at the regional level, by integrating all of the above 
findings, with the purpose of reaching a better understanding and some possible 
explanations. 
 
The third and final part of the analysis departs from the assumption that Costa Rica 
displays aspects of neo-realist behaviour not only at the regional, but also at the global, 
level. In this regard, we argue that Costa Rica has been historically employing band-
wagoning with the strong hegemonic power- the USA, and that it has also sacrificed the 
typically Tico norms of the Human Security paradigm in favour of financial and strategic 
interests.  Furthermore, we bring arguments which shed some doubt over the assumed 
pacifist identity of Costa Ricans, by underlining that the pacifist self-perception is built 
in retrospect. We end the analysis by pointing out the fact that the fate of a small 
country as Costa Rica is dependent on the large powers, and that in this game of power, 
the political and the economic are interconnected. 
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4.1 Costa Rica: An oasis of peace in a region of turmoil? 
Within this chapter, it is our aim to start answering the research question “Can Costa 
Rican international relations be understood through a neorealist perspective, or is Costa 
Rica a true exception in an international system of anarchy?” As we have earlier 
described, we have drafted three sub questions, these questions are meant as a guiding 
line for the further answering of the research question. In this chapter we will start 
answering by studying the first sub question, which is: “Could external problems of Costa 
Rica be explained by domestic and regional challenges?” With this question, it is our goal 
to investigate if Costa Rica's external problems such as the border dispute with 
Nicaragua can be explained by a neo-realist perspective and thus question Costa Rica's 
uniqueness as a peace-loving country in a region otherwise plagued by a high degree of 
violence and turmoil. Therefore, we will start our analysis with an examination of a 
number of internal conditions in Costa Rica, compared to the notion of national security, 
as it is reflected internally, as well as externally. Internally, we will examine statistics 
material from the World Bank concerning the rates of homicide and robberies, as well as 
studying the number of firearms and the spread of armed conflicts. As the last internal 
factor, we will examine the structure of the police force in Costa Rica – this is done  
because since the abolishing of the military in 1948, many military functions such as 
border control and anti-terrorism are handled under police auspices. It is one of our 
aims in this study to examine whether the abolishing of the military in 1948 was an 
actual one, or simply a relocation of military missions, functions and materials under 
police auspices. Such a fact would in our view be a partial confirmation of the 
assumption that Costa Rica's international relations can be understood through a 
neorealist perspective. In the last part of the analysis, we will shift our focus away from 
the internal factors towards the external ones in the region, specifically on-going (and 
more than 100 years old) conflict concerning the border between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, as well as investigate the Central American region's turmoil and violence. 
 
4.1.1 Criminal statistics of Costa Rica and the Central American region 
In this section of the chapter we will investigate the criminal statistics of Costa Rica and 
the Central America region in its entirety. We find this investigation of this statistic 
material relevant because, according to neo-realist theories, we firmly believe that there 
is a strong connection between high numbers of crimes e.g. homicide, armed robberies, 
and the need for military forces to keep control over the country and secure the 
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country’s sovereignty. Therefore we find it relevant to present the World Bank’s statistic 
material of homicide and robbery rates, a high number of homicides, robberies and a 
large number of firearms per inhabitants in Costa Rica (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 1). We see 
these as indicators challenging the carefully constructed image of Costa Rica as a 
country built on peace and democracy in a region historically plagued by political 
turmoil and violence (cf. section “Central America a region of turmoil and violence”). In 
the following two figures, we have listed the statistic materials for homicide and robbery 
rates for Costa Rica and the Central American region, the numbers also consist of 
countries in the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, but we will not use these 
numbers, as we solely want to investigate the Central American region. 
 
Figure 1 – Homicide rates in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (World 
Bank, 2011, p. 1) 
 
Figure 2 - Robbery rates in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (World Bank, 2011, p. 2) 
 
 
 
With a population of about 4.522.124 in 2008 (Cf. appendix: World Bank – Costa Rica 
Population) and a homicide rate of 5 per 100.000 inhabitants (World Bank, 2011, p. 1), 
Costa Rica would therefore see about 226 murders according to the data. These 
numbers are low in contrast with the other five countries in the Central American region 
(World Bank, 2011, p. 1) Guatemala (homicide rate 45), Honduras (homicide rate 43), El 
Salvador (homicide rate 58), Nicaragua (homicide rate 14) and Panama (homicide rate 
11). And this would qualify Costa Rica as a calm sea in a problem-prone region because 
of the relative low homicide rate. In contrast to these numbers, Spain has approximately 
the same population as Central America, of about 40 million people, yet Spain registered 
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336 murders in 2006 and thereby has a homicide rate of approximately 0,84 per 
100.000 inhabitants, while Central America registered a total of 14.257 murders in 
2008, which is relatively high, compared with the numbers of Spain. (World Bank, 2011, 
p. 1) In our future work, we will not continue this comparison between Central America 
and Spain, which has only served the purpose of placing the region's situation in 
perspective. In our future work, we will therefore focus exclusively on the Central 
American region, as we hold the opinion that Costa Rica’s situation should be undersood 
and explained in a regional context. Bearing this setting in mind, we find it possible to 
argue that the low level of murders and robberies compared with the region gives 
evidence of a more peacful country, which goes well in line with the alleged special 
Costa Rican spirit of peaceful cooperation,  instead of the use of violence. 
 
Figure 3 - Homicide rates by subnational areas (World Bank, 2011, p. 3) 
 
 
As it has earlier been investigated, Costa Rica has the lowest rate of homicides in the 
Central American region. But behind this national number there could be hidden local 
differences e.g. it could be argued that there are local areas which have a significantly 
higher homicide rate than the national average. Therefore, we find it relevant to include 
figure 3 in our analysis of the homicide rate in Costa Rica, as the figure shows that there 
is an even distribution of the homicide rate across Costa Rica, hence that there are no 
areas that have an abnormally high homicide rate. 
 
 31 
 
4.1.2 Numbers of firearms in Costa Rica and armed conflicts in the region 
In this section of the chapter, we will focus on the legislation regarding firearms and on 
the numbers of firearms in the countries of the Central American region, in order to 
make a comparison with Costa Rica. We would like to investigate whether it can be 
argued that the country's philosophy of peace, cooperation and the belief in the works of 
international organization both applies at the level of the average citizens’ everyday life, 
or only at a higher, theoretical level. According to the statistic materials from the World 
Bank for the region in 2007 (Table 1), Costa Rica has the lowest number of firearms per 
person out of the six counties in Central America – scoring only half the numbers than 
the second lowest (Panama) and more than five times less than number one 
(Guatemala). 
 
Table 1 - Firearms owned by civilians in Central America, 2007 (World Bank, 2011, p. 20) 
Country Registered Estimated Firearms per 100 people 
Costa Rica 43.241 115.000 2,8 
El Salvador 198.000 450.000 7,0 
Guatemala 147.581 950.000 15,8 
Honduras 133.185 450.000 6,2 
Nicaragua NA 385.000 7,0 
Panama 96.600 525.600 5,4 
 
Figure 4 - Intensity of armed conflict in Central America (World Bank, 2011, p. 19) 
 
 
Furthermore, we find that Costa Rica, compared to the rest of the , has a relatively high 
degree of tranquillity. According to data from 2009, Costa Rica does not register any 
32 
 
armed conflicts anywhere in the country (cf. figure 4). Whereas neighbouring country 
Nicaragua, again according to data from 2009, has no areas without armed conflicts, but 
several with either: moderate, severe or very severe armed conflicts (cf. figure 4). Only 
Honduras and Panama which, like Costa Rica, can be found at the lower end of the scale 
in relation to firearms per person, can claim to be without armed conflict (cf. figure 4). It 
looks ceteris paribus that there may be a correlation between the number of firearms 
per person in a country in the region and the number of armed conflicts. One 
overwhelming problem with this statistic material is that it doesn’t give us a clear idea 
whether it is the low numbers of firearms that gives the low number of armed conflicts 
or if it’s actually the other way around, i.e. that the low number of armed conflicts  
results in a low number of firearms. We therefore easily end up in a Columbus- like 
argumentation about the egg and the chicken.  
 
4.1.3 Police as national security  
4.1.3.1 The Police force  
As stated earlier in this report, Costa Rica has, since the abolishment of its military force, 
devoted the remaining expenditures on security, education, health and culture. Even 
though there are no armed forces listed officially in Costa Rica, and military 
expenditures are very low, we would argue that the growing emphasis on national 
security by an increased investment in police forces and technological surveillance 
equipment is a move towards a more neo-realistic agenda. Last year, due to the border 
disputes, there has been an increase in the training of police forces to protect the 
country from drug/human trafficking or smuggling of illegal weapons, even though the 
World Court has prohibited the two countries to station any soldiers at the borders. 
Although still a strong belief in peacekeeping the official rhetoric of Costa Rica has 
changed more towards a protective, defensive one, emphasizing the sovereignty of its 
territory.  
 
The border police unit has this year increased with 153 men, which is a relatively small 
number, and they have been trained in rural policing, weapons handling, first aid, 
satellite tracking, cartography, combat patrol plus explosives for the price of one million 
dollars (ticotimes.net, 2011). This can be seen as a defensive move from the Costa Rican 
side, and may thus signal a gradual shift towards neorealism.  
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Security minister Tijerino states the official program of the border-patrol police: 
 
“fighting the trafficking of drugs, people, currency and weapons, as well as 
providing for the protection of national sovereignty.” (ticotimes.net, 2011) 
 
While the official statement of president Laura Chinchilla stresses a focus on:  
 
“…looking at ourselves with a bigger dose of national dignity. At the heart of it, 
that’s what this is about, a specialized, professional and civil police force, and 
seeing how we are capable of ensuring minimal conditions for protecting our 
land and for national defense,” (ticotimes.net, 2011) 
 
Despite Costa Rica’s focus on being a peacekeeping nation, with a reliance on defense by 
international courts and organizations such as UN, it still comes down to being able to 
protect your country from invasion or, shall we say, other interests, which is why Costa 
Rica is forced to change rhetoric in many cases, and to invest more in national security. 
We would argue that the rhetoric of the Costa Rican police force is superficial in that it 
defines the police force as strictly devoted to maintaining social stability and fighting 
crime, while their the actions are more military in character, serving also a main 
purpose of maintaining national security. We will in the next section further explain the 
assignments, values and budget of the Police Forces, as expressed by official Costa Rican 
sources.  
 
4.1.3.2 Organisation and subdivisions, attributions 
The overall attributions of the police in Costa Rica are summed-up by Article 107 of the 
Organization of the police corps and of supportive police and administrative organs 
assigned to the Ministry of Public Security (Organización de los cuerpos policiales y 
órganos de apoyo de carácter policial y administrativo adscritos al Ministerio de 
Seguridad Pública): (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública (1), 2011) 
 
(…) [T]he functions of the police, which are exercised by the members 
of the legally constituted police forces are:  
 
- To guard over, maintain, conserve and re-establish the public 
order and citizen safety, 
 
- To prevent the manifestations of delinquency and to 
cooperate for repressing them, 
 
- To defend national sovereignty,  
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- To warrant the security and integrity of people and their 
goods, ¨ 
 
- To secure the respecting of the rights and liberties of citizens, 
 
- To contribute to the carrying out of norms relating to the 
protection and conservation of nature, of the environment 
and of historical and cultural heritage, 
 
- To control the usage and handling of arms and explosives, and  
 
- To carry out the decisions of jurisdictional, electoral and 
administrative organs.  
 
The entire police force in Costa Rica is divided in the following departments 
(“direcciones”): the Public Force (Fuerza Publica), the National Coast Guard Service 
(Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas), the Air Vigilance (Vigilancia Aérea), the Drug 
Control Police (Policía de Contol de Drogas), the National Police School (Escuela 
Nacional de Policía), the Private Security Services (Servicios Privados de Seguridad) 
and the Division of Weaponry (Armamento). (http://www.msp.go.cr/direccion/, 
accessed: 29th Nov. 2012) Under the Minister of Public Security, there are three vice-
ministers, each dealing with a specific branch of security, as follows: the Vice-minister 
of Regular Units of the Public Force (Viceministerio Unidades Regulares de la Fuerza 
Pública) is in charge of the Public Force and of the National School of Police, the Vice-
minister of Special Units (Viceministerio Unidades Especiales) is in charge of the 
Division of Weaponry, of the Coast-Guard Service, of the Air Vigilance, of the Drug 
Control Police and of the Private Security Services, and the Administrative Vice-
minister (Viceministerio Administrativo) is dealing with the administrative tasks, such 
as managing the Human Resources department, the finances and the IT. (Ministerio de 
la Seguridad Publica, 2012) 
 
The following is a list of the attributions of two of the most relevant for our purposes of 
the above divisions, as they are stated in the Ministry’s official declarations.3 
 
The main sub-division of the police is the one in charge with the most frequent police 
tasks, outside the scope of special assignments. Thus, the Public Force covers the main 
tasks of ensuring that law and order are respected. These are: (1) Executing the policies 
                                                        
3 All the translations from official Spanish language sources which follow over the next pages are our own. 
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and actions of citizen and national security, in exercising and respecting the Political 
Constitution, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maintaining the public 
order. (2) Securing the respect for the properties, rights and liberties of the residents of 
the Nation. (3) Watching over the fulfillment of international treaties, and of the 
juridical directives which guarantee order in the terrestrial frontier zones, 
including public and diplomatic buildings, airports and venues where migratory 
and customs activities take place. (4) Carrying-out of those police activities- within 
the boundaries of the Public Force’s competence- which may be rightfully required by 
state institutions, by elaborating a report and sending/referring the evidential elements, 
if that is fitting. (5) Coordinating for a rapid and effective capture of prison fugitives and 
people eluding justice. (6) Offering help and cooperation to local administrations, State 
institutions, public service entities, and in general, to communities, within the 
boundaries of its [the Public Force’s] competencies. (7) Collaborating with 
international police organizations, with the purpose of preventing and repressing 
criminality, based on the principle of reciprocity and in conformity with the 
directives and agreements in vigour. (8) Watching over the fulfillment of what is 
stipulated in the Law of Weapons and Explosives, and in the latter’s reforms. (9) 
Maintaining updated registers and inventories of the weapons, ammunition, explosives 
and equipment which are indispensable to the fulfillment of their [the Public Force’s] 
functions.  (10) Elaborating the necessary registers in order to account for police 
operations, for all those responsible within the operations, for the personnel intervening 
in the operative, patrolling or police action, as well as the full name and other 
information regarding the detained persons, their times of entry and exit of the police 
unit. (11) Fulfilling its functions without limitations of schedule, with the required care, 
courage and dedication, towards the purpose of achieving the dispositions of the 
juridical regulations. (12) Maintaining strict confidentiality over the information 
gathered during the investigations and operations, whether concluded, or in progress. 
(Ministerio de Seguridad Pública (2), 2011) 
 
The most relevant attributions of the Public Force, in the context of the present project, 
have been underlined in bold letters. As such, article one of the above list of police 
functions stresses quite explicitly the importance of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, which are connected to the notion of national security. The language used 
seems almost neo-realist in character, and leaves no doubt that, regardless of the fact 
they do not possess a military, Costa Ricans are firmly committed to protecting state 
sovereignty, in case that this becomes necessary. We could furthermore comment on 
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article three of the declaration, which alludes to border protection in case of any 
possible threat. This leaves no doubt that, given Costa Rican Public Force’s explicit 
commitment to national security and national sovereignty, they would be prepared at 
any time to deploy all the necessary police forces to intervene in case of turmoil at the 
borders. One such case might be the border conflict with Nicaragua. The Public Force 
could at any times be summoned to ensure the fulfillment of “the juridical directives 
which guarantee order in the terrestrial frontier zones (…) and [in] venues where 
migratory and customs activities take place” (cf. Art. 3 above). However, it should be 
noted that the famous institutional and collaborative side of Costa Rican policy is also 
present in the Ministry of Public Security’s statements about the role of the police, since 
the Public Force is due to “watch over the fulfillment of international treaties” (Art. 3) in 
what regards frontier areas, and to “collaborate with international police organizations, 
with the purpose of preventing and repressing criminality” (Art. 7). 
 
Outside the above-described structure of the Ministry of Public Security, there is an 
additional corps of police reserves- The Reserve of the Police Forces (la Reserva de las 
Fuerzas Policiales), which is under the direct commandment of the Minister of Public 
Security, and not directed by any of the vice-ministers. (Ministerio de la Seguridad 
Publica, 2012) According to the statement issued by the Ministry, the attributions of the 
Reserve of the Police Force, which can only be used under special circumstances, 
generally cover the following (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública (2), 2011):  
 
1. Coordinating with the Public Force in the workings of prevention, vigilance and 
protection within the national territory, in order to preserve the security of the 
residents, of their goods, and of their constitutional rights and liberties.   
 
2. Cooperating with the Public Force, with the governmental institutions and 
other entities in cases of calamity or natural disasters, of massive events, 
conflagrations and civil upheaval. 
 
3. Implementing the orders of the Supreme Court of Elections in electoral matters, 
in coordination with the Public Force and in conformity with the Political 
Constitution and the other applicable directives. 
 
4. Watching over the fulfillment of the environmental directives, exercising the 
tasks of surveillance, protection and conservation of the environment and 
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denouncing to the competent juridical and administrative organs of those acts 
and omissions which contravene with the [environmental] directives.  
 
5. Fulfilling the pertinent actions in order to capacitate the Reserve of the Public 
Force, in conformity with the necessities and functions which are being carried 
out.  
 
6. Anything else deriving from the juridical orders, in conformity with the 
Reserves’ competency. 
 
Perhaps under extraordinary circumstances, the Reserve Forces play the role of a buffer 
or of back-up forces, which can roughly be said to cover the functions normally 
attributed to the military or paramilitary forces (such as the Gendarmerie, in France). 
Since Costa Rica has no military forces, it had to have a force which can intervene under 
emergency situations. Of special interest is the fact that civil upheaval is a specific case 
when the Reserve corps is actually entitled to act in support of the state, in order to stop 
such upheaval. In a militarized country, this task would be secured by the army. 
  
4.1.3.3 Budget 
In 2010, the Ministry of (Public) Security had allocated a budget of 129800 million Costa 
Rican colones (approximately 259 million US dollars). However, in 2010, approximately 
13 % of the allocated budget remained unspent, leaving room for debate regarding why 
that has been the case. Interesting to note that the total budget allocated to the Ministry 
of Public Security has been on the rise since 2008 onwards, proportionately with the 
percentage of money which has been allocated, but not invested/ used. As such, the total 
budget in 2008 was of 83.400 million colones, it rose by 27 % in 2009, and by a further 
24 % in 2010, when it had reached the above-mentioned 129.800 million. Furthermore, 
the allocated budget was another 20 % higher for 2011, reaching 156.000 million 
colones  (La Nacion, 2011). 
 
The rising numbers of funds allocated to the police in Costa Rica can be understood as a 
sign of neo-realist behavior, and we will return to this consideration in the analysis 
section, by corroborating factual information found here, with information regarding 
Costa Rica’s border conflict with Nicaragua, and with practical applications of Collier’s 
theory regarding peer pressure.   
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4.1.4 Central America a region of turmoil and violence 
Through the project we are emphasising the influence of the Central American region on 
Costa Rican foreign policy making, and we are referring to the region as one of turmoil 
and violence. Therefore this section serves to provide an adequate contextual 
description of why the region can be seen as of great conflict and violence, through an 
investigation of the deeply rooted, external relationship to the Nicaraguan neighbours, 
and the difficulties of choosing side in the ideological conflicts of the Sandinista regime 
change in the 80’s, which has led to a disputed policy of neutrality. The problems of 
regional drug trafficking add further to the picture of turmoil. 
 
In the 1980’s Costa Rican tranquil democracy experienced unease, due to fear of 
terrorist activities in the neighbouring country Nicaragua. Even though the troubled 
relationship to Nicaragua can be traced back as early as the independency of Costa Rica, 
our point of departure will be this period due to a shift from personal dictatorships to 
more ideologically dependent, following long-term violence such as civil wars and 
terrorism (Furlong, 1987, p. 121). At that time, the democratic countries of Honduras 
and Guatemala experienced guerrilla violence, terrorism and military influence, and 
Nicaragua continued a path of authoritarian rule. Even though Costa Rica remained and 
still remains today of a democratic rule, this period challenged its existence, and 
provided grounds for a disputed foreign policy of neutrality. These events also provide 
ground for explaining why there is even today an on-going border dispute between 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica.    
 
Some of the major external challenges that Costa Rica underwent in the 80’s were a 
deterioration of regional trade, unpaid Nicaraguan debt, debts owed to foreign lenders, 
and 200,000 refugees seeking asylum, employment, food and shelter in Costa Rica, plus 
the fact that Costa Rica was at the time a haven for political refugees, which all affected 
the nation’s economy (Furlong, 1987, p. 124) 
 
Costa Rica also experienced some difficulties in international politics. The USA were 
sceptical of the Arias Peace Plan (cf part 3), while at the same time Costa Rica might 
have lost some credibility in the region due to the then presence of US supported anti-
Sandinista contras which were opposed by the Arias administration (Furlong, 1987, p. 
124). At that time, the presence of these could worsen the already troubled relationship 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which we would argue is still true today with the 
escalation of the border dispute. 
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Issues concerning the border dispute have recently been taken up by both countries in 
the International Court of Justice, but the conflict stretched far back in time. The 
historical events of the border dispute thus go as far back as 1824 where Costa Rica 
acquired the Northern borders of the province of Nicoya, which were originally 
Nicaraguan. Through the years 1838-1848, the two countries negotiated the northern 
border area, more precisely there were problems with the north west boundary and a 
need for a port between the northern Caribbean coast, e.g. also differences regarding 
navigation rights along the San Juan River Boundary line in the north east (Furlong, 
1987, p. 126). Some of the more recent cases, which we want to emphasize as being of 
great importance for the implications in the relationship between the two countries are 
concerning firstly a dispute for custom rights in the San Juan River and secondly a 
proceeding by Nicaragua accusing Costa Rica for violating their sovereign rights. These 
are both cases proceeded by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The first case (from 
2009) revolves around custom rights of fishing, which ordered in favour of local 
fishermen from both the Nicaraguan riverbanks and the Costa Rican riverbanks to fish 
in the river (International Court of Justice, 2009) 
 
The second (from 2011) concerned Nicaragua instituting proceedings against Costa Rica 
for violating their sovereignty and creating environmental damages to their territory. 
This case revolves around the construction of a road by Costa Rica, running parallel and 
in close proximity to the southern banks of the river, extending for at least 120 km from 
Los Chile in the West to the Delta in the eat, which Nicaragua believes will have 
environmental consequences for the wetland of the area (International Court of Justice, 
2011). This resorted in the ICJ fixing some timelines for each country to hand in 
memorials (International Court of Justice, 2012). These cases represent a continuing 
conflict on the disputed border areas and are also contributing to the description of 
Central America as a region of great turmoil. Four other major issues implicated the 
relations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in the 80’s.  
 
1. The only nation to ever have invaded Costa Rica is Nicaragua (Furlong, 1987, p. 
127)4.  
 
                                                        
4 This was in 1856 when the North American William Walker were president of Nicaragua. Also by Somoza 
regime in the 1940’s and 50’s, and in 1983-86 by the Sandinista regime (Furlong, 1987, p. 126). 
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2. The two countries have very different political systems. Costa Rica is a stable 
democracy, while Nicaragua underwent many dictatorial rulers (Furlong, 1987, 
p. 127). 
 
3. Different cultures and value systems create attitudes of difference and conflict, 
rather than similarities and cooperation toward each other (Furlong, 1987, p. 
127). 
 
4. There is a great difference in social and economic development between the two. 
We would argue that past problems of illiteracy, poverty, poor health care and 
rural underdevelopment in Nicaragua (Furlong, 1987, p. 127) have created the 
great regional violence and tension we see today between the two.  
 
A more current issue is the troubles of drug trafficking throughout the Central American 
Region. According to the UN International Narcotic Control board, the amount of cocaine 
passing through the region in 2010 may equal about five percentages of the countries’ 
GDP, and Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras were for the first time identified as major 
transit countries (BloombergBusinessweek, 2012). This resulted in an increased rate of 
murder in the Central American region. According to numbers provided by the UN office 
of drugs and crime ranging within the period of 2006-2010, the drug-related murder 
rate rose in Costa Rica from 7-11 pr. 100,000 inhabitants, while the rates in Nicaragua 
were of 13, 41 in Guatemala and 82 in Honduras (ibid.).  
 
The problem of drug trafficking is one of the main reasons for us to describe the Central 
American region as a region of turmoil and violence. The issue has created great political 
debate within the region and the USA, where the former is accused of poisoning the 
region by being the greatest user, which created a basis for regional proposals to 
legalize drugs within (BloombergBusinessweek, 2012). Even though the US opposed this 
and officially has a goal of reducing the demand, Costa Rica ratified a law in 2011 to 
decriminalize drug possession in recreational quantities (ibid.).  
 
4.1.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have focused on investigating if external problems can be explained 
by domestic and regional challenges. In the first part, we have investigated if there can 
be found indications on Costa Rica not fully fulfilling its branded image as a unique 
 41 
 
peace-loving country in a region otherwise plagued by a high degree of violence and 
turmoil. We have found that the social statistics material for Costa Rica shows low 
numbers in regard to homicide rates, low numbers of firearms in civilian hands and a 
low number of armed conflicts. These numbers would on one hand suggest that the 
uniqueness of Costa Rica indeed is true, but we have also found numbers indicating an 
increase in the Costa Rican police force budget, together with an increase in the 
numbers of officers (this in a country that already has relatively high numbers, 
considering their branding as a peace-loving country).  Another aspect of the force is 
that following the abolishment of their military, the assignment regarding national 
security, which is otherwise the task of the military forces, was allocated to the police. 
Ideological conflict, different rates of social and economic development, the continuous 
border dispute and increasing violence due to an exploded rate in drug trafficking 
throughout the region have created ground for qualifying the Central American region 
as of turmoil and violence.   
 
Taking the findings of part one into consideration, we will thus move on to the second 
part of our analysis, where we focus on how Costa Rica has affected the rest of the 
Central American region by removing its armed forces and providing pressure for 
regional cooperation of military reduction.  
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4.2 Costa Rican military spending as regional peer pressure? 
4.2.1 Critique of military reduction in the Central American Region 
In part two of the analysis, we would like to emphasize how the Central American 
region- with Costa Rica as the leading example- has come to have a common level of 
military spending as a percentage of the GDP. By the Central American Region, we 
understand a focus on the neighboring countries of Costa Rica, such as Nicaragua, 
Panama and Guatemala, which all have approximately similar levels of military spending 
measured by percentage of GDP.  
 
When looking at military expenditures, one can find different results, depending on 
where one searches. The World Bank website’s measure on military expenditures as 
percentage of GDP shows no indications on Costa Rica. The website uses the NATO 
definition to define military expenditures, which are armed forces, peacekeeping forces, 
defense ministries and other paramilitary forces, i.e. those trained and equipped for 
military operations (World Bank, 2012). The World Bank indicates that they cannot 
account for:  
 
“….civil defense, reserves  and auxiliary forces, policy and paramilitary forces, 
dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, 
pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one 
part of government to another (World Bank, 2012) 
 
There are thus many facts not taken into consideration by the World Bank.  Costa Rica 
brand themselves as a peacekeeping non-military country, and most correctly the World 
Bank helps maintaining this image. If looking into military expenditures measured by 
other organizations, there will be different results, which might show contradictions. 
The World Factbook, which is part of the CIA, indicates that Costa Rican military 
expenditures is 0,6 % of the GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). This measurement 
of 2009 numbers is more adequate for representing the case of Costa Rica, because it 
includes both public expenditures and police personnel. The interesting thing about this 
measurement is that neighboring states follow the same trend, Nicaragua 0,6 % and 
Panama 1 %, while Guatemala is as low as 0,4 % (ibid.). By incorporating some of the 
empirical findings and hypothetical examples provided by Paul Collier (jf the theory on 
military spending), we will firstly argue for Costa Rica having successfully achieved 
what seems to be a stable peace throughout the region. Secondly, we will turn to our 
previous findings in part one of the analysis arguing for a link between local and 
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regional challenges on the one side, and an increased focus on national security on the 
other.  
 
4.2.2 Attempts of regional cooperation in military de-escalation 
This section will touch upon four aspects, which Collier argues that influence greatly 
regional cooperation on military reduction. We will thus use his findings to see how 
these have affected Costa Rica and Central America. Those four are (1) the relationship 
between interdependency and reciprocity, (2) high levels of democracy, (3) the size of 
the population and (4) a transparent link between social spending and military 
spending. (1) Paul Collier states that reciprocity is one of the most important issues in 
dealing with interdependency. Recalling the theory of military spending, the theoretical 
terms neighborhood public good and bad were mentioned as influencing the level of 
spending. As we have seen through part one of the analysis, the rooted tension in the 
relationship between the two neighbors Costa Rica and Nicaragua makes reciprocity in 
interdependency hard, and thus creates many obstacles for maintaining a regional 
cooperation on military reduction, even though statistical numbers do not show this.   
 
There are though successful attempts for regional cooperation on the issue. Costa Rica 
has coordinated with other countries from the Latin American region to reduce military 
spending, through for example the Rio Treaty and others such as the Arias Peace Plan. 
The attempt of the Rio Treaty in 1947 was the first of its kind and its focus was on 
external threats to the region. Collier argued that the treaty addressed the wrong 
security problem, because the threats facing the region were more of an internal 
character, and therefore the strong need for a cooperative process to reduce military 
spending (Collier, 2007, p. 24). For interdependency to work, Collier argued that there 
needs to be a mutual reciprocity between countries. For the Latin American Region, the 
first step for mutual military de-escalation was the Ayacucho Declaration in 1974, which 
were followed by numerous steps, which Collier doesn’t believe have produced decisive 
change (ibid). Considering the allocation of security resources to the police force 
mentioned in the first part of the analysis and the continuing border conflict, we believe 
that the increasing funds spent on the police force are no different from military 
spending. (2) Collier argues that the second aspect, high levels of democracy, has an 
effect on reducing military spending. He argues for causality between raising democratic 
standards across the region as a type of regional coordination and de-escalation of 
military spending. Democracy scores of the Latin American Region in 1997 are thus 
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applied to argue for the causality, where the whole region is of 7.6 compared to a global 
average of 4.9 (with 0 being the lowest indicator of a democratic regime and 10 being 
the highest), while Costa Rica scores a 10 (Collier, 2007, p. 19). The argument is that a 
strong upward trend in the average democracy scores for the Latin American region has 
been the result of a successful strategy to raise democratic standards and de-escalate 
military spending. He then simulates that this causality would create a reduction of 12 
%, which implies a large saving of 3.4 million dollars.  The empirical evidence backing 
up his simulation are clear, but what he does not take into consideration is the size of 
the police force and the budget spend on it concerning national security matters. (3) The 
third aspect, the size of population is important in considering the budgeting of military 
spending. The Central American region is of small populations and this might have 
influenced the more easily attainable consensus in the agreements on e.g. The Rio 
Treaty. The Rio Treaty is superficial, because it does not take into account the 
ideological differences, as pointed out in part one, between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
which create ongoing tensions and incentives for an increase in resources spent on 
national security.  (4) The fourth aspect, transparency in the link between social 
spending and military spending, provides another incentive for neighboring countries to 
follow troop on the military de-escalation. Transparency in spending is on the one hand 
made clear by Costa Rican governments, by presenting values and goals stated on 
official government websites. On the other hand, it is hard to find any proper links 
between inequality and foreign debt, and the amount of money spent on the police 
assignment for national protection.   
 
Through an article written on the abolition day on 1986 by the president, the ministers 
of public safety, public education, culture, youth and sports and foreign affairs, the 
renewal of the purpose of the abolishment is described. It describes that instead of the 
army, the state will have a police force to monitor and maintain public order, while still 
being subject to civil power, and for defense of national sovereignty, Costa Rica depends 
on international institutions. The Neutrality Proclamation of November 17th 1983 
reflects the national values of peace, freedom and non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other countries (El Espíritu del 48, n.d.). This report stresses that despite the 
efforts of allocating financial resources from the army towards education and health etc., 
Costa Rica is still a sovereign state that needs to look after its national interests. There is 
still the issue of national security that needs to be addressed.  
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4.2.3 Costa Rica a neighborhood public bad 
Opposed to Colliers empirical findings on regional coordination on reducing military 
spending, we will in this section argue that the increase in border patrol forces and a 
larger investment in military education create peer pressure. We will thus arrive at an 
argument on peer pressure affecting neighboring countries to obtain similar behaviors.  
 
The military reduction of Costa Rica can be seen as a regional initiative to create peace 
in Latin America, which on the surface appears to have worked, looking at a declaration 
such as the Ayacucho of 1974 as a somewhat successful example. We would though use 
the arguments that the non-growth of military spending in the Latin American region 
has to do with the pace of the growth (Collier, 2007, p. 4). This has also to do with the 
fact that Costa Rica has through many decades shown a different action than their 
official rhetoric. Examples of such actions are an increase in the training of police forces, 
border patrol, i.e. measures connected to national security. Despite that, the rhetoric of 
for example the police force would still claim to protect Costa Rican citizens’ rights, 
maintain social stability and provide national security. We would argue that this is a 
reversed incentive for military spending, also considering the escalated border dispute 
with Nicaragua. This is an important aspect, because we see it as a consideration not 
taken into account by respectively the World Bank and the CIA World Factbook. 
 
In the theory of military spending, we mentioned that a rationale for positive military 
spending was to fight rebellions. As stated earlier, one of the reasons for the 
abolishment of the army was to prevent active revolts. The theory of military spending 
argues that this exceptional case of revolts should be incorporated in how the Latin 
American Region calculates military spending. Thus these resources spent by Costa Rica 
can be seen as a legitimate need to fight revolts and should not be seen as an illegitimate 
pressure for others to increase military expenditures. Opposed to this view, we would 
argue that the aspects of interdependency and reciprocity create a more hostile 
environment for Costa Rica and its neighboring countries. This is the case because the 
effect of interdependency would be a vicious circle, due to the fact that Costa Rica 
through the 80’s and onwards has increased resources spent on national security issues 
concerning the police forces.  
 
Through the previously mentioned manifesto of Collier, the example of Costa Rica’s 
zero-military spending could be seen as a role model for other regions to develop a 
mechanism for providing incentives for compliance, such as agreements on making a 
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link between a reduction in military spending and increases in social spending. We 
believe that there is always an incitement for a country to have at least a minimum 
spending on national security, which we have argued is the growing number of special 
border police forces in Costa Rica. Such incitements are many in the Central American 
region, as in the case of the border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the 
crime rate in the countries, plus the drug trafficking. This is why we believe that Collier’s 
manifesto of reduced military spending through regional coordination cannot work in 
the context of Central America, because it faces too many obstacles.  
Even though we find a lot of evidence for regional coordination in the Latin American 
region as creating a solid ground for de-escalation of military spending, we still don’t 
think this covers the whole story. There is more to it. Regional coordination can be a 
contributing factor to minimalize the amount of military presence in a region. However, 
first of all, the relationship between economic growth and increased military spending 
needs to be addressed as low in the Latin American Region, and second of all the border 
dispute, with its increasing presence of either Nicaraguan soldier or Costa Rican special 
border police forces, illustrates a region fit for a neorealist explanation. Overall, despite 
the efforts of regional coordination in the Latin American region, the border dispute and 
fighting drug trafficking are strong incentives for a positive military spending even 
though major organisations such as the world bank and the CIA Factbook provide data 
on the region as non-military.  
 
4.2.4 Summary 
This section has provided some insights on Collier’s empirical findings concerning 
regional cooperation on military de-escalation, which we have applied for the Costa 
Rican case. Even though numbers show indications of low military spending in the 
Central American region, the rooted tension in the relationship between the two 
neighbors Costa Rica and Nicaragua makes reciprocity in interdependency hard, despite 
the fact that statistical numbers do not show it. We thus believe that Costa Rican 
political actions, despite attempts for regional peacekeeping, show more signs of being a 
neighbourhood public bad, than good, considering the increase in the police force 
budget and a larger focus on national sovereignty. 
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4.3 Hegemonic aspects of Costa Rican behaviour in foreign policy 
After having explored some aspects related to national security and regional turmoil, the 
final part of our analysis will focus on Costa Rican foreign policy behaviour in a larger 
context, and in connection to certain economic aspects. Our main starting point for this 
has been to test whether one can find further evidence of Costa Rican neo-realist 
behaviour, despite their commitment to liberal, institutional collaboration and 
progressive discourses.  Liberal norms and peace-loving discourses are an important 
constitutive element of Costa Rican society’s self-perception. However, they come in 
second after economic realities, and after the relations with hegemonic forces. 
 
Despite the liberal, peace-loving and peace-keeping discourse, we argue that Costa Rica 
has, in fact, displayed a full array of defensive neo-realist tactics, among which band-
wagoning with the strong hegemonic power- the USA, and sub-ordination of the Human 
Security norms to financial and strategic interests. It is difficult to separate internal and 
external politics, since the two are always connected in very complex ways, and can 
influence one another. Undoubtedly, Costa Rican values have been crucial in forming a 
national spirit, and Oscar Arias’ first mandate as a president has led to a practical 
realization of the Costa Rican peace-loving national spirit in the region, which was the 
creation and signing of the Arias Peace Plan, the biggest step towards enhancing 
conditions for peace in the region. Leaving aside the peace-loving norms, however, we 
argue that a small nation as Costa Rica is forced to adopt survival tactics at the level of 
external politics and move beyond subjective values, when faced with the hard realities 
of power politics and domination in the arena of international politics and international 
political economy.  
 
In order to prove this point, namely that values and liberal cooperation come in second 
after the power games of the strong, this section will touch upon distinct aspects. Firstly, 
there is a brief overview of Costa Rican foreign policy tactics and events, with a special 
emphasis on the USA- Costa Rica diplomatic and political relationships. Secondly, we 
bring into the discussion the particular event of Costa Rica changing diplomatic 
recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China 
(mainland China). Finally, these relationships are followed from an IPE angle, with a 
focus on the concept of Odious Debt, which we claim is another instance of USA 
hegemony, enforced through creating a vicious circle of economic and ultimately, 
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political dependency, in which smaller countries are caught and forced to play by rules 
imposed on them from the outside.  
 
John Peeler’s “Costa Rica. Neither Client, nor Defiant” provided the starting point for this 
section, as it is a brief historical overview of the main events and inclinations which 
have shaped Costa Rica’s foreign policy during the second half of the 20th century. The 
main conclusion reached by Peeler is supporting our assumptions, in that he claims that 
typical Costa Rican foreign policy is essentially of a neo-realist nature. Although it also 
displays traditional features of strong institutional collaboration, that is more to be seen 
as a secondary trait. According to Peeler: 
 
 “The normal foreign policy of Costa Rica since World War II has had three 
characteristics: 1. Support for the United States on issues of strategic 
importance to the latter; 2. Partial disengagement from Central American 
affairs, especially as regards political integration; and 3. Moderate idealism 
with regard to international law, if that idealism did not conflict with the first 
two characteristics.” (Peeler, 2003, p. 31). 
 
However, Peeler focuses on the particular instances during Costa Rican history in which 
this typical trajectory was rather different, as it was shaped by other factors, such as 
“idiosyncratic factors of personality and historical circumstance”. During certain 
particular moments, the typical Costa Rican leaders had an important role in changing 
the course of foreign policy, according to their own personal political vision, and making 
use of the (favourable) circumstances on the international political arena. (Peeler, 2003, 
p. 43).  
 
Among the most striking remarks within the article are the ones which refer to what 
Peeler considers to be the typical Costa Rican attitude when engaging in external affairs, 
which is a rather humble and servile one, if one is to read between the lines. In a neo- 
realist light, one can easily understand the band-wagoning that Costa Rica has been 
forced to resort to at different stages of its history. For example, Luis Alberto Monge, 
who was president of Costa Rica during 1982- 1986, displayed a “quintessentially Tico” 
policy, according to Peeler, which involved “knowing how much one must bend in order 
to avoid being broken”. (Peeler, 2003, p. 41). Monge bended quite a lot without being 
broken, and did so with survival and financial calculations as a first priority, leaving the 
liberalist, institutional focus on a secondary position. The facts were actually that “he 
(Monge) went as far as he had to in supporting U.S. policy in Nicaragua (including tacit 
but substantial support for U.S.- funded Contra forces and CIA covert operations out of 
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Costa Rica), and received in return substantial aid on terms less exacting than those of 
the International Monetary Fund”. (Peeler, 2003, p. 35). Costa Rica desperately needed 
financial aid in order to recover from the difficult external debt crisis of the 80’s. We 
shall return to the issue of Costa Rica’s debt in the 80’s, by explaining other political 
aspects connected to it. 
 
First, however, we take the analysis closer to our times, when another Costa Rican 
president, Oscar Arias, acted in the same calculated manner during his second mandate 
(2003- 2007). Arias’s behaviour in his first mandate (1986- 1990) was driven by a 
brilliant vision and understanding of the political circumstances (Peeler, 2003, p. 44), 
and had led to the most significant step towards lasting peace in the conflict- prone 
region of Central America: the signing and implementation of the Arias Peace Plan. 
(Peeler, 2003, pp. 35-36). This marked a historical point for Latin American de-
militarization and won Oscar Arias the Nobel Prize for Peace. (ibid.) As well-intentioned 
and worthy of praise as Arias’s previous accomplishments were, one can still consider 
them as the exercise of political opportunism and skilful calculations of circumstances 
(Peeler, 2003, p. 43), regardless of the (perhaps) noble and pacifist motives which have 
triggered the actions.  It is within this light that we have chosen to interpret Arias’s 
behaviour in his second mandate as a president, in relation to the China- Taiwan issue.  
 
4.3.1 Diplomatic Shift toward People’s Republic of China 
The article  “Costa Rica’s Neo-realist Foreign policy: Lifting the Veil Hiding the 
Discursive Co-optation of Human Rights, Human Security, and Cosmopolitan 
Official Rhetoric.” was found to be relevant for our research due to its focus on a 
particular recent historical event which involved Costa Rica and its then president, 
Oscar Arias. The event is Costa Rica’s official switch in diplomatic recognition from the 
democratic Republic of China (Taiwan), to The People’s Republic of China, based on 
economic interest, can be interpreted as neo-realist behaviour on behalf of Costa Rica. 
Although von Feigenblatt’s methodology is constructivist and therefore, focuses on 
norms, our main interest has been in understanding the historical event discussed by 
von Feigenblatt within the frame of our neo-realist research. 
 
 By using a constructivist methodology, which emphasizes the ideational and value-
based side of international relations, the article points to the inconsistency between the 
public discourse and the external politics pursued by Costa Rica’s former president, the 
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Nobel prize winner Dr. Oscar Arias. Although the methodology suggested by Otto von 
Feigenblatt is beyond the scope of the present report, since it proposes an updated 
version of the constructivist model of norm socialization, the Parallel Cycles Model of 
Norm Socialization, we have found Feigenblatt’s interpretation of the events and 
discourses involved in his new theoretical norm socialization model to be of relevance 
for our understanding of Costa Rica’s behaviour and, additionally, of its self-image.  The 
model has a focus on the way in which norms are being created, internalized, challenged 
and finally changed, and it was used in order to understand and account for the 
incompatibility between the genuinely internalized norms of Human Security among the 
Costa Ricans (the “Costa Rican Consensus” since more or less the 80ies onwards)5  
(Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 23) and the state actions of president Arias, who led secret 
negotiations with The People’s Republic of China (Mainland communist China). 
 
Oscar Arias had led secret negotiations with The People’s Republic of China (Mainland 
communist China) since 2004, which finalised with the Arias administration giving 
public recognition to the latter, at the expense of Costa Rica’s traditional recognition and 
support of The Republic of China (Taiwan). The Act of Relations signed by Costa Rica 
and the PRC on June 1st 2007 was seen by many as a self-interested neo-realist betrayal 
of Costa Rican norms and values, done with the sole purposes of financial gain, since the 
deal included that China will buy 300 million in Costa Rican sovereign bonds with an 
interest of 2 %, and that China would give Costa Rica $130 million as non-refundable 
assistance (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 17). All this had been done at the expense of Costa 
Rica’s implicit support for the communist state and their breaking ties with Taiwan, a 
democratic state with more similar values to the Tico ones (Feigenblatt, 2008, pp. 
3,12,14,15). The Act of Relations could be understood as nothing more than a sell-out. 
Furthermore, what Oscar Arias’ action has done was to deal a blow to Costa Rica’s huge 
capital of soft power and credibility accumulated over long years (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 
18) and to disappoint the Tico nation by an unpopular decision taken behind closed 
                                                        
5 The term Costa Rican Consensus has more than one meaning. On the one hand, in von Feigenblatt’s 
understanding,  “Costa Rican Consensus, [is a] term used in the paper to refer to the political attitudes of the 
majority of the population at any one time.” (von Feigenblatt 2009: 19) However, the appealing idea of a 
national consensus (which, as we shall prove later in the project, is not a very often-encountered scenario) 
has also been used to understand something more specific. As such, the Costa Rican Consensus is a name 
given to an international aid strategy, which “conditions aid on demilitarization” (Sánchez, 13 June 2007, p. 
4) The strategy has been drafted and suggested to the UN by Costa Rica, under the second presidential 
mandate of Oscar Arias, precisely in June 2007, ironically enough, after the signing of the Act of Relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. The Costa Rican Consensus, in the understanding of Arias, refers thus to 
the following: “The idea is simple: debt relief and development aid should reward countries that spend less on 
their militaries, and more on health care, education, and environmental protection. It is time that the 
international financial community reward not only those whose budgets are balanced, as it has done till now, 
but also those whose budgets are moral.” (Sánchez, 13 June 2007, p. 4) 
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doors (Feigenblatt, 2008, pp. 12-13). Last, but not least, Feigenblatt notes that by signing 
the agreement with PRC, Arias affected Costa Rica’s possibility of expressing any serious 
criticism against Chinese policy and human rights abuses in Tibet. (Feigenblatt, 2008, 
pp. 18-19). The following statements have been chosen by Feigenblatt as an illustration 
of cognitive dissonance and of Costa Rica’s delicate situation after the deal with PRC. The 
words are part of the same statement (thus having a rather confusing effect), belonging 
to the Costa Rican Minister of Foreign Affairs and following the death of 100 Tibetans 
after Chinese government repression: 
 
“Costa Rica is a sovereign country and its foreign policy is independent, 
likewise, we respect the territorial sovereignty of the People's Republic of 
China; but at the same time we have dealt with the topic of human rights with 
them, which has been a topic for discussion at all levels, including the visit that 
Oscar Arias undertook to China and the conversations held with their 
ambassador in our country. 
 
The topic of respect for religious and cultural diversity in Tibet should be dealt 
with; Costa Rica sees as a good sign, the fact that the International Press has 
been allowed to enter Tibet. (Feigenblatt, 2008, pp. 18-19) 
 
Since they come from the official of a long-standing champion of democracy and peace, 
such as Costa Rica is, these statements support Feigenblatt’s arguments and give a bitter 
lesson on the nature of world politics. Although opinion polls make clear that Costa 
Ricans do genuinely share the norms and values of the Human Security Paradigm 
(“Sustainable Development, Human Development, civil and political rights, economic, 
cultural and social rights, Collective Security, Common Security, self-determination, and 
respect for international law”) (Feigenblatt, 2008, pp. 10-11) this matters little in 
comparison to the hard realities of neo-realist politics which has been pursued by their 
president. Although this switch from Taiwan to China can be seen as nothing more than 
calculated business, the president had chosen to keep the discourse of Human Security, 
which gave way to what Feigenblatt coins “cognitive dissonance”: 
 
“The cognitive inconsistency experienced by Costa Ricans after the breakup 
with Taiwan and the subsequent recognition of the PRC is shown by the general 
condemnation of the action, the arguments of inevitability given by the 
President, and the contradictory and convoluted statements made by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Tibet.” (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 13). 
 
Otto von Feigenblatt’s main conclusion, which we intend to make use of, is the following: 
 
“Costa Rica’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC and the 
subsequent break of relations with the ROC goes against the Costa Rican 
consensus and also represents a sharp break with traditional Costa Rican 
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foreign policy. (…) while conducting a realist foreign policy, as in the case of 
the PRC, it continues to use the language of Human Security and Human 
Rights. Thus we conclude that decision makers are co-opting the language of 
Human Security and Human Rights in order to protect themselves from the 
consequences of openly deviating from the Costa Rican consensus [in von 
Feigenblatt’s use of the concept] and also from forfeiting the benefits of the 
“soft-power” accumulated by Costa Rica over the years, through its 
responsible internationalism.” (Feigenblatt, 2008, p. 23) 
 
Perhaps the most significant and regrettable consequence of Oscar Arias’s agreement 
with the Popular Republic of China is the loss of credibility and soft power which Costa 
Rica and its former president benefitted of. This is still viewed as a stain on the 
democratic tradition of Costa Rica and sheds doubts and a dark shadow over the 
reputation of a Nobel peace prize winner and refined intellectual as Arias is. But within 
our argument, it comes only to prove that discourses come in second after power 
politics. As such, the scandalous breaking of the Human Security paradigm that was 
caused by president Arias’ recognition of People’s Republic of China might not be 
considered as an exception, but rather as a continuation of typical Costa Rican foreign 
politics, marked by survival calculations, in pursuit of the country’s (financial) self- 
interest.  
 
Pursuing this line of thought, namely that discourses are important in shaping or 
sustaining identities which do not always correspond perfectly with reality, we shall 
provide some examples of historical cornerstones of Costa Rica when this had been the 
case. It is our intent to thus expand on our point that neo-realist behavior can co-exist 
with, and prevail over discourses of peace. Furthermore, we will provide examples of 
the fact that discourses of pacifism and collaboration can be built in hindsight, at some 
time after a particular event has taken place. Slowly and gradually, the emerging 
discourse on what had happened begins to blur the actual events and starts to occupy a 
place in national collective memory. 
 
4.3.2 Costa Rican Self-perception 
General Costa Rican self-perception stresses almost unanimously that Costa Rica (and, 
thus its inhabitants) are peaceful and peace-loving. This is mostly taken to be an 
undisputed fact and is now part of all main-stream discourses about Costa Rican 
identity. (Huhn, 2009, pp. 11-12). However, it has been claimed that the pacifist self-
image can be understood as part of a national myth, based on discourses which are built 
in retrospect. (Huhn, 2009). The construction of this national pacifist (self) image of 
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Costa Rica can thus be also understood as a careful strategy of self-branding, based on 
discourses, and not on facts. Although we have previously found that Costa Ricans 
genuinely share the values of the Human Security paradigm, it is quite questionable 
whether these values are a consensus, and whether there can be found empirical 
evidence to support the fact that the values are applied in practice, and not just simply 
adhered to in theory. 
 
Some of the evidence brought for supporting the peaceful and peace-loving identity of 
Costa Rica is usually historical, and makes reference to a few particular events which are 
considered to be symbolic “cornerstones of Costa Rican national self-perception” (Huhn, 
2009). Those events are the civil war against the Communist-collaborator president 
Calderon, followed by the abolishing of the army in 1948, the declaration of neutrality 
issued under the president Luis Alberto Monge, in 1983, and the Arias Peace Plan in 
1986-1987, which rewarded president Oscar Arias with a Nobel Peace Prize (Huhn, 
2009, pp. 6-7). Through a historical analysis of the discourses which were used by the 
two main Costa Rican newspapers (La Nación and La Prensa Libre) at the time when the 
events were unfolding, Sebastian Huhn documents the fact that the apparent national 
unity surrounding the political decisions taken on the above-mentioned events is merely 
a construct, because each of the events was a cause for debate, interpretation and 
criticism (Huhn, 2009, pp. 26-27).-Furthermore, it is only in hindsight that discourses 
and meanings of pacifism were attached to the particular historical events, which were 
not associated with a national peace-loving identity at the time when they unfolded. It is 
thus only in retrospect that the narratives regarding Costa Rican peace-loving identity 
were created (Huhn, 2009, pp. 12,26,27). For instance, the abolishing of the army has 
been long turned into an example of pacifist spirit and noble intentions, but the political 
move was, in itself, highly contested and even opposed by force at the time when it 
occurred (Huhn, 2009, p. 18). In Huhn’s words, “defense of social order was most 
important, not the symbolic expression of a certain peaceful national identity” and “the 
apparent peacefulness of the nation received much less attention in the moment of the 
abolition itself than it would receive later in the collective memory” (Huhn, 2009, p. 17). 
The same logic of discourse construction in retrospect applies also in the cases of 
Monge’s proclaiming the neutrality of the country in the face of regional turmoil in the 
beginning of the 80’s. The public opinion was highly divided, and many voices criticized 
this act as a dangerous act of passivity, which would allow communism to flourish in the 
neighboring country, Nicaragua, and thus threaten Costa Rican security. (Huhn, 2009, p. 
22). Additionally, the views of many people at the time did not consider the move of 
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declaring neutrality as one motivated by pacifist views, but rather as a skillful exercise 
of foreign policy:  
 
“Declared neutrality requires willingness for combat; it is not the expression of 
a certain national identity, but rather a political act with consequences for 
further action.” (Huhn, 2009, p. 19) 
 
Since the analysis has thus far in this section dealt with the point that financial self-
interest is more important than the aspects connected to norms and values, it will 
proceed with an overview of International Political Economic issues concerning the 
USA- Costa Rica relationship. It is structured this way, in order to underline the fact that 
small state behavior always has to take into consideration the interests of the 
hegemonic power. It does not necessarily entail that small nations are fully subordinate 
to the wishes of the hegemons, nor that they will always act the way the former wishes, 
but simply that hegemonic domination is important and that it does not only cover 
military aspects, but also economic ones. These need to be understood when discussing 
the foreign policy options of a small nation as Costa Rica is. However, the topic is 
supplementary to all the other aspects presented in the project, and will therefore be 
presented rather briefly, and it will leave out extremely technical financial aspects, 
which are outside the scope of our present research. These could, nonetheless, be taken 
at a deeper level on future occasions. 
 
4.3.3 Odious Dept  
This analysis has reached the point of financial self-interest, it will proceed with an 
overview of International Political Economic issues concerning the USA- Costa Rica 
relationship. The discipline of IPE has as its subject matter “the relationship between 
politics and economics, between states and markets” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 
196)It is, however difficult to say if one can reach a mercantilist or a Marxist conclusion 
when dealing with the USA- Costa Rica relationship. We do not intend to analyse the 
issue in full detail, but will only bring it in the discussion as a further illustration of 
power politics unfolding, and of hegemonic domination that also include a strong 
economic dimension.  
 
The case study of Costa Rican foreign debt in the beginning of the 80’s is interesting to 
place in an international relations framework. Pérez and Weissman (2007) discuss at 
length the legal matters surrounding odious debt. Costa Rican debt was not odious per 
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se, because it had not been contracted by a dictator, against the wishes and interests of 
its population. Despite that, however, the Costa Rican debt and especially the legal 
disputes which followed around it deserve a place in the discussion of odious debt, 
because they shed light on the interaction between politics and economics in drawing 
spheres of influence and patterns of hegemonic domination. Turning the tables around, 
the discussion of hegemonic US influence is relevant for our understanding of Costa 
Rican behaviour, placed in the framework of international power relations and band-
wagoning. USA had been the main lending country ever since the end of First World War 
(Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 19) and certain legal and institutional features make it 
traditionally possible for a tight connection to exist between the state and the banks, 
more specifically, between the State Department and leading bankers.6 Adding further 
to the picture of domination, the legal disputes concerning repayment of foreign debt 
are usually solved in a US court-room, based on the inherently amoral principles of 
private law, which do not account for entangled issues of economic and political factors7 
(Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 48). This was also the case when assessing the Costa 
Rican case of foreign debt. 
 
In 1983, Costa Rica was the first Latin American country to stop its payment of foreign 
debt, due to the fact that the country was unable to support such crumbling expenses. 
(Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 50). During the governing of President Rodrigo Carazo 
(1978- 1982), economic and political crises began to be felt in Costa Rica. (Peeler, 2003, 
p. 34) The Carazo government avoided cut-backs in social spending, and was thus forced 
to go into huge foreign debt, in order to support the welfare system. (ibid.) This led to 
terrible economic consequences and marked the beginning of a “decade of twin systemic 
crises” (idem), and of a gradual system switch.8 This gradual switch towards neo-
liberalism had its price, as  
 
“debtor countries had to sell off state ownership (…) and privatize without 
regard to benefits or drawbacks of such economic restructuring.” (Pérez & M. 
Weissman, 2007, pp. 38-39). 
  
                                                        
6 “In fact, as early as June 1921, J.P. Morgan [the most powerful banker of the time in the USA] pledged that 
all future loans to foreign governments would be undertaken with the full knowledge of the State 
Department.” (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, pp. 19-20). 
7 “Private law, notwithstanding its designation as apolitical, often serves political interests as much as it 
responds to the logic of the market. Its political dimensions are of the order of the market, not the order of 
human rights. Although its bias may be “rendered invisible by an ideology that defines the private sphere in 
apolitical terms,” private law often “functions ideologically and normatively to support the value and 
superiority of economic liberalism”. (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 47). 
8 “The ‘transition to neoliberalism” of the late 1980s implied the replacement of the social democratic model 
by structural adjustment and cut-backs in social security, education and health.” (Oettler, 2007, p. 7) 
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As we have previously mentioned, the sub-sequent Monge government tried to recover 
from the economic crisis by offering tacit support to USA covert operations against the 
Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua, despite the 1983 official proclamation of Costa 
Rican military neutrality. This “typically Tico” behavior (of band-wagoning in order to 
protect their interests) was motivated by the need for significant foreign funding, which 
the USA could provide Costa Rica with, in the exchange of the latter’s loyalty. (Peeler, 
2003, p. 35). Following the stopping of debt repayment, a syndicate of 39 creditor banks 
(Allied Bank International) made an address to solve the matter in court. While the USA 
courts twice ruled favorably for Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago- a Costa Rican bank 
which received the loans from Allied Bank International- their attitude changed 
dramatically the third time when the case was tried, after an appeal. (Pérez & M. 
Weissman, 2007, pp. 50-57). The first trial ended with a re-financing of the debt, but one 
of the banks in the Allied syndicate appealed, which resulted in the case Allied II. The 
court also ruled favorably the second time, and decided that “Costa Rica’s actions in 
cancelling repayment of debt were consistent with the law and policy of the United States 
and that both the U.S. legislative and executive branches were fully supportive of Costa 
Rica’s actions.” (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 57). The support for Costa Rica was very 
firm and explicit: 
 
“President Reagan and the Congress reacted sympathetically to Costa Rica's 
financial crisis and its default on Foreign Assistance Act loans. The President 
advised that [continuation of] U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent with 
the commitment of this Administration and in Congress to help Costa Rica 
regain economic viability. We therefore regard such assistance, which is 
designed to help the Government with financial and management reforms and 
with needed credit to the private sector, as vital and in the national interest. 
We are hopeful that bilateral debt restructuring will be completed within the 
next several months.” (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, pp. 51-52). 
 
The third time when the case was appealed and tried, the court changed however their 
position against Costa Rica, and motivated this by the “act of state doctrine”9, suggested 
by the USA which interfered in the case as “amicus curiae”10 (Pérez & M. Weissman, 
2007, pp. 52-53). Avoiding a well-defined determination of the application of act of state 
doctrine (ibid.), the court decided that “the situs of the debt was the United States and not 
Costa Rica” and that “Costa Rica’s unilateral effort to repudiate private debt was 
                                                        
9 “A doctrine stating that each sovereign state has complete control over the laws within its own borders and 
that its acts cannot be questioned in the courts of another state. This is important to economics and trade 
because it means that investors in one country cannot sue to force a company or the government in another 
country to take an action favorable to them; they must go through the domestic courts for redress. While 
international agreements and conventions temper the act of state doctrine, it remains important.” (the Free 
Online Dictionary (1), 2012) 
10 A person not directly engaged in a case who advises the court (the Free Online Dictionary (2), 2012) 
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inconsistent with U.S. policy on debt obligation and contrary to U.S. interests” (Pérez & M. 
Weissman, 2007, pp. 53-54). This change in attitude happened over a relatively short 
period of time, from October 1983 to June 1984 (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 55), 
which lead the authors of the article to wonder what reasons might be behind such a 
shift in views. The answer, which they have found, is that political reasons and US 
interests were behind the court rulings. As such, the Reagan administration completely 
changed their attitude towards Costa Rica and decided to be less permissive with Costa 
Rican debt repayment, due to an important event which had just occurred in Costa Rica: 
President Luis Alberto Monge’s declaration of neutrality, in November 1983 (Pérez & M. 
Weissman, 2007, pp. 55-56). The declaration of neutrality went against the interests of 
USA, which were focused on intervening against the perceived Communist threat of the 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. With Costa Rica proclaiming their neutrality, the USA 
lost an ally and decided that Costa Rica deserved a certain ‘punishment’ for the latter’s 
behavior (Pérez & M. Weissman, 2007, p. 56), which went against the wish of the 
hegemon. We could thus dare to argue that economic domination is another aspect 
which influences the foreign policy options and neo-realist behavior of Costa Rica.  
 
This further stresses our argument that the fate and foreign policy options of Costa Rica, 
as a small nation, are intrinsically connected with the international power 
constellations. Issues concerning both regional conflict and regional cooperation such as 
attempt of reduction on military spending plus global hegemonic domination, have a 
crucial importance for the strategies which Costa Rica could choose to endorse.  
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion  
The main function of our conclusion is to answer our research question: Can Costa Rican 
international relations be explained through a neorealist perspective or is Costa Rica a 
true exception of peace and cooperation?  This will be achieved first of all by 
incorporating the findings presented in our analysis and secondly, by trying to maintain 
a critical position towards our findings.  
 
Through investigating specific historical circumstances of both Costa Rica and the 
Central American region, we have found indications of Costa Rican internal structures 
not fully corresponding with their public image of peace and cooperation. We have 
found that the social statistics material for Costa Rica shows low numbers in regard to 
homicide rates, low numbers of firearms in civilian hands and a low number of armed 
conflicts. However, we have also found indications that support our overall assumption 
that the international relations of Costa Rica can, to some extent, be explained within a 
neo-realist perspective. This is especially seen in the increasing budget of the police 
force and the increasing numbers of officers assigned to the force, together with the 
numbers of national security functions handled by this force. We therefore see some 
indication of the police being strengthened and taking over some traditional functions of 
the military, although the official army has long been abolished. The second part of the 
analysis has both provided insights on what determines military spending in the case of 
Costa Rica, and what successful attempts have been made on regional coordination to 
reduce it, such as the Rio Treaty and the Arias Peace Plan, while at the same time 
critically investigated possible causalities between a rise in police expenditures as a 
function of national security. The third part of the analysis has been centered on 
investigating possible instances of Costa Rican neo-realist behavior at the global level of 
foreign policy, in terms of its relations to great powers. 
 
Despite its historical uniqueness, and despite the special, peaceful conditions which 
have generally shaped its evolution, we argue that neo-realist behavior has been the 
case in many of the foreign policy acts conducted by Costa Rica. This has to do with both 
domestic and regional challenges affecting their behavior in foreign policy, but also with 
hegemonic issues. We have shown these to be Costa Rica seeking the protection of 
stronger, hegemonic powers in overt or covert instances of band-wagoning, or by 
sacrificing liberal traditions to financial self-interest. The latter has, in turn made Costa 
Rica employ a strategy, which is usually necessary for small states, in order to survive or 
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to promote their national interest. The nature of international relations and the gradual 
socio-economic system switch which had begun in the 1980’s left the country in need of 
viable foreign policy strategies. However, the neo-realist behavior has still maintained 
the liberal discourse of Human Security, as well as the trade-mark international image of 
Costa Rica as the champion of democracy, and example of institutional collaboration. 
This was further argued in the second part of the analysis, where we looked at some 
successful attempts for regional cooperation on military reduction in the Central 
American region, despite our findings of an increase in the budget of the police force 
concerning national security assignments. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Costa 
Ricans still view themselves as pacifists and peace-loving. Notwithstanding that, as we 
have discussed, this self-image could also be nothing more than a national myth, 
carefully constructed in retrospect in the collective consciousness of the people, who 
have mostly been concerned with stability and national security at the time when major 
events were unfolding. Survival has always been a major concern for a small nation like 
Costa Rica, which does not, of course, exclude a genuine interest for collaboration and 
human rights. But, as Peeler has argued: “…moderate idealism with regards to 
international law”, comes in second after the hard realities of power politics (Peeler, 
2003: p. 31). Outside the scope of our research, one could argue that what Costa Rica has 
employed were strategies of soft power, based on a positive country branding and a 
good reputation on the international arena. But that is a potential thread for future 
research. 
 
We are aware of the limitations and biases which have marked our research, due to the 
fact that it has been guided by neorealist assumptions. This might have limited our 
findings and their explanations, but we however do not believe that the validity of our 
evidence was diminished.   
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Chapter 7 : Appendix  
7.1 World Bank – Costa Rica Population 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
3.147.451 3.224.849 3.303.412 3.384.498 3.468.918 3.557.095 3.648.263 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3.740.578 3.831.504 3.919.180 4.002.946 4.083.197 4.160.438 4.235.605 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
4.309.413 4.381.820 4.452.608 4.522.124 4.590.790 4.658.887 4.726.575 
 
 
7.2 LA GACETA Nº 21 DEL 31 DE ENERO DEL 2011 
N° 36366-SP 
 
CAPÍTULO IX 
 
Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía 
 
Artículo 210.—La Dirección de la Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía dependerá del (de la) 
Ministro (a).  Tendrá competencia en todo el territorio nacional y sus miembros deberán 
respetar las órdenes, directrices y  lineamientos que establezca la Dirección. 
 
Artículo 211.—La Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía, cuando haya sido convocada de 
conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley General de Policía y sus reformas, tendrá, en 
esas circunstancias y dentro de ese marco de competencias, las siguientes funciones: 
 
1) Coordinar con la Fuerza Pública las labores de prevención, vigilancia y 
protección en el territorio nacional, para preservar la seguridad de los (las) 
habitantes, sus bienes y sus derechos y libertades constitucionales. 
 
2) Cooperar con la Fuerza Pública, instituciones gubernamentales y otras entidades 
en casos de calamidad o desastre natural, eventos masivos, conflagraciones y 
conmoción civil. 
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3) Hacer cumplir  lo ordenado por el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en materia 
electoral, en coordinación con la Fuerza Pública y de conformidad con la 
Constitución Política y demás normativa aplicable. 
 
4) Velar por el cumplimiento de la normativa ambiental, ejerciendo las labores de 
vigilancia, protección y conservación del ambiente y denunciando, ante los 
órganos administrativos y judiciales competentes, aquellos actos y omisiones 
que contravengan esta normativa. 
 
5) Realizar las acciones pertinentes para procurar la capacitación de los miembros 
de la Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía, de acuerdo con las necesidades y 
funciones que desempeñan. 
 
6) Aquellas otras que se deriven del ordenamiento jurídico, de conformidad con su 
competencia. 
 
Artículo 212.—Cuando la Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía no se encuentre convocada, 
procurará la capacitación policial de sus miembros y prestara colaboración a la 
Dirección de Programas Preventivos Policiales en materia de prevención del delito. 
 
Artículo 213.—La Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía estará conformada por la Dirección 
y las dependencias necesarias para su debido funcionamiento. 
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7.3 LA GACETA Nº 21 DEL 31 DE ENERO DEL 2011 
N° 36366-SP 
 
TÍTULO II 
 
Organización de los cuerpos policiales y órganos de apoyo 
de carácter policial y administrativo adscritos al Ministerio de Seguridad Pública 
 
CAPÍTULO I 
 
Disposiciones generales de este título 
 
Artículo 97.—La Guardia Civil, la Guardia de Asistencia Rural, la Policía Encargada del 
Control de Drogas no Autorizadas y Actividades Conexas y la Policía de Fronteras 
dependerán del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, en concordancia con lo estipulado en 
artículo 6 de la Ley General de Policía N° 7410 y sus reformas; asimismo con lo 
dispuesto en la Ley N° 8000 que crea el Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas y el Decreto 
Ejecutivo N° 23427-MP. También estará adscrita la Reserva de la Fuerza Pública, cuando 
sea convocada con carácter temporal. 
 
Artículo 98.—Los alcances del presente reglamento se extenderán a todos los cuerpos 
policiales y a todos los órganos de apoyo de carácter policial, agrupados dentro de las 
fuerzas de policía adscritas a este Ministerio, de modo que el marco de actuación de 
cada uno de éstos y de sus servidores queda debidamente regulado. 
 
Artículo 99.—La Guardia de Asistencia Rural, la Guardia Civil y la Policía de Fronteras, 
como partes integrantes de la Fuerza Pública de este Ministerio, en lo que se refiere a la 
seguridad, vigilancia ciudadana y mantenimiento del orden público mediante patrullaje 
por tierra, actuarán bajo un solo mando policial, en cada región que el Ministerio 
determine en el territorio nacional, de conformidad con las competencias y atribuciones, 
que les otorga la Ley General de Policía y sus reformas.En cuanto a la seguridad y 
vigilancia policial del territorio nacional y resguardo de fronteras mediante patrullaje 
aéreo, así como la seguridad aeroportuaria, de conformidad con las competencias y 
atribuciones que otorga la Ley General de Policía y sus reformas, se estará a lo regulado 
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en el capítulo que regula a la Dirección del Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea, del presente 
Reglamento. 
 
Artículo 100.—Se entiende por prevención del delito, el conjunto de estrategias, tácticas 
y acciones que realiza el Ministerio, con la finalidad de conservar el orden público, la 
tranquilidad de los habitantes, el libre disfrute de las libertades públicas y de disminuir 
el riesgo de los habitantes a ser víctimas de alguna conducta delictiva. 
 
Artículo 101.—La prevención del delito se llevará a cabo, mediante la actuación de la 
Fuerza Pública y el desarrollo de estrategias para la colaboración, capacitación y 
concientización de los habitantes. 
 
Artículo 102.—Se entenderá por Programas Policiales Preventivos, la estrategia de 
prevención del delito desarrollada por la Fuerza Pública, en coordinación con los grupos 
de la sociedad civil, organizados y capacitados para este propósito. 
 
Artículo 103.—La actividad policial se desarrollará, en el ámbito nacional, en forma 
descentralizada y bajo el concepto de proximidad, que implica el conocimiento del 
entorno por parte del funcionario policial y que su labor debe estar dirigida a lograr la 
interacción policía  - habitantes, con la finalidad de brindar respuesta oportuna, 
conveniente y eficaz y el servicio personalizado; teniendo la obligación de rendir 
cuentas de su gestión, cuando así sea requerido. 
 
Artículo 104.—La Dirección General de la Fuerza Pública recomendará al (a la) Ministro 
(a), mediante un estudio técnico, las regiones en que se dividirá territorialmente la 
Fuerza Pública. Para su implementación contará con el apoyo de las instancias policiales 
y técnicas del Ministerio. 
 
Artículo 105.—La Escuela Nacional de Policía es la instancia responsable de aprobar o 
convalidar los cursos obligatorios antes de incorporarse a la función policial y los cursos 
de especialidad antes de ocupar un puesto de mando o dirección. 
 
De igual forma, corresponde a este órgano definir si los (las) funcionarios (as) policiales 
que están en el proceso de capacitación en la Escuela y las personas que han 
convalidado cursos, tienen la formación adecuada para incorporarse a la función 
policial. 
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Artículo 106.—Para efectos del ingreso al Estatuto Policial, los (las) funcionarios (as) 
policiales, que en el desarrollo de sus actividades realicen, simultánea y 
permanentemente, funciones mixtas (policialesadministrativas), serán considerados 
funcionarios policiales. 
 
La calificación de la función mixta deberá hacerse luego de la realización de un estudio 
efectuado por la Dirección de Recursos Humanos, la que tomará en cuenta: la 
pertenencia del funcionario a uno de los cuerpos policiales adscritos a este Ministerio y 
haber sido nombrado de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley General de Policía y 
sus reformas. 
 
La Dirección de Recursos Humanos solicitará los informes y demás documentación 
pertinente, con la finalidad de elaborar un expediente que sustente la resolución final 
que decida el cumplimiento de las funciones mixtas. 
 
Artículo 107.—Sin perjuicio de lo establecido en otras disposiciones normativas, las 
funciones policiales ejercidas por los miembros de las fuerzas de policía, legalmente 
constituidas son: vigilar, mantener, conservar y  restablecer el orden público y la 
seguridad ciudadana, prevenir, las manifestaciones de delincuencia y cooperar para 
reprimirlas, defender la soberanía nacional, garantizar la seguridad e integridad de las 
personas y de los bienes, procurar el respeto de los derechos y libertades de los (las) 
ciudadanos (as), colaborar con el cumplimiento de las normas sobre protección y 
conservación de la naturaleza, el ambiente y el patrimonio cultural e histórico y vigilar y 
controlar el uso y manejo de armas y explosivos y la ejecución de las decisiones de los 
órganos jurisdiccionales, electorales y administrativos. 
 
También son funciones policiales aquellas actividades preparatorias o conexas 
necesarias para el cumplimiento de la labor principal y operativa de la función policial. 
 
De conformidad con lo anterior, se consideran elementos propios de la función policial: 
 
1) Ejecutar acciones en coordinación con los diferentes sectores del Estado y de la 
sociedad civil, para la prevención de las manifestaciones de delincuencia. 
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2) Captar, recibir y analizar información de interés policial para el mantenimiento 
de la seguridad y el orden públicos. 
 
3) La planificación, coordinación, supervisión, ejecución y evaluación de las 
operaciones estratégicas y tácticas, dirigidas a cumplir con las funciones 
policiales. 
 
4) La atención operacional de las emergencias de origen natural o antrópico. 
 
5) Auxiliar o colaborar con los servicios de atención de emergencias, comunidades, 
gobiernos locales y las organizaciones de servicio público, en casos de riesgo, 
catástrofe y/o conmoción pública. 
 
6) Colaborar en la protección y seguridad de los miembros de los supremos 
poderes y dignatarios. 
 
7) La participación en actividades de formación y capacitación, estrictamente 
técnico policiales, que se impartan a funcionarios policiales para el desempeño 
profesional. 
 
8) La actividad de formación y capacitación a los diferentes sectores de la sociedad 
civil en materia de seguridad ciudadana, que permitan fortalecer la prevención 
de las manifestaciones de delincuencia. 
 
9) La acción operativa tendiente a controlar y vigilar el uso y manejo de armas y 
explosivos. 
 
10) La acción operativa de inspección, supervisión y control de los servicios de 
seguridad privada. 
 
11) La labor de apoyo operativo que permite el adecuado desarrollo de la función 
policial, tal como: custodia, distribución, transporte y mantenimiento de armas y 
explosivos, la movilización de los (las) funcionarios (as) y sus suministros 
policiales. 
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12) Las actividades operativas de investigación, inspección y control para el correcto 
desempeño de las fuerzas de policía. 
 
13) Las actividades orientadas a la obtención, procesamiento y difusión de la 
información operacional que permita la toma y adopción de decisiones 
oportuna, conveniente y fundamentada. 
 
14) Vigilar y proteger las instalaciones y vías de comunicación de interés estratégico 
o táctico. 
 
Artículo 108.—Los puestos de confianza de la Fuerza Pública serán los siguientes: 
Inspector (a) General, Director (a) General de la Fuerza Pública y Subdirectores (as) 
Generales de la Fuerza Pública, Directores (as) y Subdirectores (as) de la Policía de 
Control de Drogas, de la Escuela Nacional de Policía, del Servicio de Seguridad Privados, 
del Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea, de la Reserva de las Fuerzas de Policía, de la Dirección 
General de Armamento, del Servicio Nacional de Guardacostas y Directores (as) 
Regionales de la Fuerza Pública.  
 
Artículo 109.—Las direcciones podrán proponer al (a la) Ministro (a) el nombramiento 
permanente o temporal de consultores (as), asesores (as) o de instructores (as), para 
que de manera voluntaria, colaboren con la Fuerza Pública en aquellos aspectos propios 
de la función policial. 
 
Artículo 110.—Estos (as) consultores (as) o instructores (as) deberán ser de reconocida 
solvencia moral, no serán remunerados por el servicio que presten ni ostentarán 
investidura pública alguna. Su elección y desempeño se regirá por las normas 
establecidas en el Reglamento de Servicio de los cuerpos policiales adscritos al 
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. 
 
Artículo 111.—Las direcciones generales y direcciones que estén conformadas a su vez 
en programas o subprogramas presupuestarios, podrán contar con una Unidad de 
Proyectos para lograr que las necesidades reales se transformen en proyectos concretos 
de corto, mediano y largo plazo, de conformidad con las necesidades y la dinámica 
institucional. 
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Las unidades de proyectos que se constituyan tendrán las siguientes funciones 
generales: 
 
1) Elaborar estudios e investigaciones para determinar las necesidades de 
inversión de las direcciones de programas o subprogramas presupuestarios y 
establecer el orden de prioridades. 
 
2) Elaborar los perfiles y estudios técnicos de prefactibilidad y factibilidad de los 
proyectos en coordinación con la Oficina de Planificación Institucional.  
 
3) Formular, dar seguimiento y evaluar los proyectos de inversión compatible con 
las prioridades institucionales y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, en coordinación 
con la Oficina de Planificación Institucional y de acuerdo con los lineamientos 
establecidos en el Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública. 
 
4) Colaborar en la formulación presupuestaria en lo atinente a la ejecución de 
proyectos de inversión. 
 
CAPÍTULO II 
 
Atribuciones y deberes de la Fuerza Pública 
 
Artículo 112.—La Fuerza Pública tendrá las siguientes atribuciones y deberes en 
concordancia con lo establecido en los artículos 8 y 10 de la Ley General de Policía: 
 
1) Ejecutar las políticas y acciones de seguridad ciudadana y nacional para el 
ejercicio y respeto a la Constitución Política, a la soberanía nacional, a la 
integridad territorial y el mantenimiento del orden público. 
 
2) Asegurar el respeto de los bienes, derechos y libertades de los (las) habitantes 
de la Nación. 
 
3) Velar por el cumplimiento de los tratados internacionales y la normativa jurídica 
que garantice el orden en las zonas fronterizas terrestres, incluidas las 
edificaciones públicas, diplomáticas, sedes aeroportuarias y donde se realizan 
actividades aduanales y migratorias. 
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4) Ejecutar aquellas actuaciones policiales, dentro del ámbito de su competencia, 
que le sean debidamente requeridas por instituciones estatales, elaborando un 
informe y remitiendo los elementos probatorios, si así procede. 
 
5) Coordinar para que de manera pronta y eficaz, se efectúe o realice la captura de 
personas evadidas de las cárceles o prófugos de la justicia. 
 
6) Brindar auxilio y cooperación, dentro del marco de sus competencias, a 
gobiernos locales, instituciones del Estado, entidades de servicio público y en 
general a las comunidades. 
 
7) Colaborar en la prevención y represión del delito, con base en el principio de 
reciprocidad con aquellas organizaciones internacionales de policía y de 
conformidad con la normativa y los convenios vigentes. 
 
8) Velar por el cumplimiento de lo estipulado en la Ley de Armas y Explosivos y sus 
reformas. 
 
9) Mantener actualizados los registros e inventarios de armas, municiones, 
explosivos y equipos indispensables para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. 
 
10) Elaborar los registros necesarios para hacer constar las operaciones policiales, 
sus responsables, el personal que intervenga en el operativo, patrullaje o acción 
policial, así como el nombre completo y demás calidades de las personas 
detenidas, sus horas de ingreso y egreso de la unidad policial. 
 
11) Cumplir sus funciones sin limitación de horario, con el debido esmero, denuedo 
y dedicación, para el cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el ordenamiento jurídico. 
 
12) Guardar estricta confidencialidad sobre la información obtenida de las 
investigaciones y operativos policiales llevados a cabo o en proceso. 
 
13) Los demás deberes y atribuciones señalados en el ordenamiento jurídico. 
 
